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1  Introduction
In this study I intend to probe the conceptions of humanity, understood as a distinguishing 
species attribute, in early Confucianism. I do not limit my analysis to the uses of the term ren 
仁 conventionally rendered as 'humanity' or 'humane', but rather seek to construct a 
genealogy of Confucian human-ness. While overtly present in only one instance in the Lunyu 
論語, and one of the later chapters at that,1 the distinction between animal and human would 
become an important trope of later Warring States era Confucians' discussion of organized 
society, which was seen as an uniquely human phenomenon constantly in danger of sliding 
back to disorder represented by animality. It was thought that constant vigilance and stable 
institutions were required to polish social humans out of the bestial raw stuff. Even Mencius, 
the far most optimistic of the Confucians, who claimed that humans had an innate disposition 
to good, that is to Confucian social values, thought that education was required to keep this 
sprout of humanity from being trampled by disorderly impulses. I propose to probe the 
evolution of this conception in the epoch preceding Mencius in order to better understand it's 
development in later times.
But the study of Confucianism is important not only to the understanding of itself, but also to 
other philosophies of the time. The research in late Zhou thought has long suffered from what 
Chad Hansen calls “The Fragmented–Schools View”, that sees each philosophical school 
(Daoist, Confucian, Mohist, etc.) as self-contained, elaborating their own intellectual agenda 
without much contact with the others.2 The misguidedness of such an approach is proved by 
the texts themselves, where the philosophers vocally attack each others' views testifying of a 
lively debate between thinkers of different backgrounds.3 Thus illuminating an important 
concept of one school can help us to interpret an another, if we consider it's positions to be a 
reaction to or a refutation of this concept. I'm thinking especially of Daoism here, as the 
Daoist thinkers make frequent use of animal parables and clearly have an idea of naturalness 
very different of the Confucian tradition. I am hoping that by analyzing the Confucian 
conception of humanity that is intimately linked to society,  better sense could perhaps be 
1 18:6
2 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought a Philosophical Interpretation, 11–12.
3 Hansen, 95–96.
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made of the  beasts and beastly men proliferating the Daoist corpus.
In order to bring something new to the interpretation of the Lunyu, a text that has been studied
for more than two thousand years already, I will initiate my study some five hundred years 
before the birth of Confucius in the establishment of the Zhou dynasty. I intend to search for 
the roots of Confucian humanity in the institutions and rituals of the dynasty that provided for 
Confucius the model for perfect government. Idealized models aside, I see ideological 
developments as reflections of changes in the society that produces them, thus making study 
of social history essential for the history of ideas. By basing my interpretation of Confucius as
a response for certain changes happening in his surroundings, I hope to make it heavier so it 
can get to the bottom of things.
The primary material for this study is the oldest layer of the Lunyu, that is chapters 3-7 and 9.4
By only including these chapters I hope to accomplish two things, namely to limit the breadth 
of the study to match formal requirements for theses, and more importantly, attempt to get to 
grips with the earliest views of the Confucian school as it was forming and before it engaged 
with its competitors. In the study I will use the convention of calling the content of these 
chapters the thought of Confucius, fully cognizant that the text is surely a product of at least 
editing and compilation of later generations. References to the Lunyu are made giving the 
number of the chapter followed by a colon and the number of the section within the chapter, 
ie. X:Y. All the translations from the Lunyu are my own.
1.1 The Hypothesis and Research Questions
I believe that social reality has it's influence in the intellectual domain, which means that any 
reading of a text that claims historical significance cannot separate it from the environment 
that it grew out of. That is why the Confucians of my interpretation are motivated by the 
4 Mestari Kongin Keskustelut, 32–33.
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social changes going on in the Zhou world since 9th or 10th century BCE: The breakdown of 
the old aristocracy and increasing social mobility that contributed to the growth of a new  
identity that transcended the system of lineages that governed the early part of the dynasty, 
and the formation of centralized states with bureaucratic governments.5
The Confucian agenda was aimed redefining li 禮, the rituals of ancestral veneration that had 
governed the life of the Zhou elite and attempted at ensuring political stability. Earlier on this 
had been based on the magical efficiency of the connections to the spiritual realm, and later 
on into a more conspicuous regulation of social privilege.6 By the time of Confucius, this 
system had all but broken as the lineages formerly united by their ritually defined kinship ties 
had renounced mutual solidarity and engaged in violent competition for power. The 
Confucians saw that returning to the old li would be impossible due to social developments, 
and also inimical to their interests, as Confucius himself and most of his disciples came from 
outside the old lineages. A return to aristocratic privilege would have meant that they would 
have been shut out of political power. The idea that veneration of common ancestors bestowed
a sense of community even to social groups comprising of members of different status,7 thus 
allowing for harmonious existence was still tempting, however, and I aim to show  that it was 
exactly this idea that was taken by early Confucianism and expanded in scope to fit the 
changed society.
The Confucians were the first to consider li as a separate category of action and analyze it as a
system separated from the context of individual rites.8 They saw the social value of such a 
system and devised a program of education geared towards producing persons with a sense 
for ritualized interaction. The difference was that whereas the old Zhou system had united the 
descendants of a single ancestor to celebrate his power and partake of it, the Confucians 
expanded the cultural group to comprise the whole civilized world by substituting the 
biological ancestors with cultural one. They claimed that all participants in the Zhou ritual 
order were the descendants of the former kings who had possessed the power and wisdom to 
create the social institutions that had survived to this day, and that the power lived on in 
everybody, because they had been molded by those very institutions, as long as they were 
5 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 9,25.
6 Falkenhausen, 156.
7 The Zhou lineages contained members of widely differing social ranks, see Falkenhausen, 160.
8 Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven, 39.
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prolonged by continued adherence to them. Just as the ancestors of old required ritual 
nourishment in order to sustain their existence and provide assistance for the living 
generations, the cultural ancestors had to be fed by rituals, that were detached from their 
religious context and expanded to become the enactment of those traditional social forms, or 
they would be forgotten and thus unable to secure stability for their “children”.
In short, I presume that the agenda of early Confucianism was to shift the primary personal 
identity of the people of the Zhou from their lineage to the whole cultural sphere, thereby 
fostering a feeling of inter-lineage solidarity lost because of the collapse of the old system. 
This new identity manifests itself as a stress on humanity/human-ness in Confucian writings. 
My study will hope to answer the following questions: How is li linked to political power 
during the Zhou dynasty up to the warring states period? What is the relationship between li 
and humanity/human-ness? How does the relationship of humans and animals and Zhou- and 
non-Zhou peoples develop during the Zhou dynasty up to the Warring States period?
2 A Brief history of the Zhou dynasty
The Zhou dynasty started around 1045 BCE, when an army led by their leader who would 
become King Wu 武王 defeated the army of the Shang 商 dynasty outside their capital and 
proclaimed himself the inheritor of the right to govern possessed by the Shang kings.9 The 
Zhou were a people who had largely assimilated into Shang culture sharing their religion. 
Their geographical origins are disputed by scholars, but they had settled into what would 
become known as the Plain of Zhou (Zhouyuan 周原) in the Wei river valley west of the 
Shang lands in the 12th century BCE.10 After establishing several of his brothers and other 
9 Shaughnessy, “Western Zhou History,” 309–10.
10 Shaughnessy, 306.
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relatives to rule over the former Shang lands and creating an another royal capital nearby, 
king Wu returned to the west and died two years later. His son was crowned as a new king, 
Cheng 成, but king Wu's younger brother Dan duke of Zhou 周公旦 claimed the new king too
young to rule and set himself as a regent with his half-brother duke of Shao 召公 as the Grand
Protector, taibao 太保, of the king. These news were met with open rebellion from the dukes' 
siblings left to rule the Shang lands in the east, but duke Zhao managed to subdue the rebels 
and continued the campaign further east and north to lands outside Shang's sphere of 
influence and followed the example of king Wu in setting relatives up to keep the new lands 
under Zhou control11.
This set up the basic structure of the Zhou world: the royal domain in the west and areas ruled
by relatives in the east. These two halves were separated by mountains, which could only be 
traversed through a narrow pass.12 This meant that the connections between them were 
difficult to keep up, which would influence the decline of the royal house some two hundred 
years later. The regency of duke Zhou was brought to an end after seven years after duke Shao
and king Cheng manouvered him out of the royal administration and he retired to the western 
capital Chengzhou 成周 and does not feature in historical sources after that.13 His successful 
military campaigns ensured that the dynasty lived mostly free of threats to its rule for the long
reigns of king Cheng and his successor Kang 康. After about a century the political 
environment deteriorated and the dynasty faced attacks from the east, south and critically for 
the royal line's domain, from the northwest. King Kang's successor Zhao 昭 attempted to 
respond to the southern threat that had the potential to cut the narrow line of communication 
between the western and eastern halves of the realm, but his campaign resulted in a 
catastrophe with the king himself dying and the western royal armies entirely lost14。
This loss of concrete military strength and prestige led to a decline in the power of the royal 
house. Its control of the states in the eastern part of the realm slowly loosened, and the 
military threat in the northwest increased to the point that the royal capital itself was raided by
the invaders. There were also irregularities in the succession, with sources seeming to indicate
the king being driven out of the capital at one point for over a decade by someone outside the 
11 Shaughnessy, 310–13.
12 Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, 36–37.
13 Shaughnessy, “Western Zhou History,” 313–17.
14 Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, 93–94.
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royal line, and also competing pretenders from within it. All the while the dynasty attempted 
unsuccessfully to bring its eastern subjects back into its control with increasingly draconian 
measures,在15 which eventually led to one of the states allying itself with the kings' 
northwestern enemies and sacking the capital, driving the royal family east to it's secondary 
capital, where they would rule in name only for the next five hundred years or so, while their 
former subordinates vied for supremacy amongst each other, marking the division between 
Western (1045-771 BCE) and Eastern (771-221 BCE) Zhou periods. Western Zhou history is 
conventionally again sub-divided into three periods: early (King Wu to King Zhao, 1045-957 
BCE), middle (King Mu 穆 to King Yi 夷, 956-858 BCE), and late (King Li 厲 to King You 
幽, 857 to 771 BCE). Eastern Zhou, on the other hand, is divided into two eras, the Spring and
Autumn, Chunqiu 春秋, (771-481 BCE), named after surviving text composed  on the basis of
annals of the state of Lu 魯 covering the aforementioned years, and the self-evidently named 
Warring States, Zhanguo 戰國, (480-221 BCE) that terminates on the unification of the Zhou 
world under the state of Qin 秦, who was able to conquer all its rivals.
This interstate competition led to important changes in society as the states attempted to 
mobilize all resources available to them to best their rivals, or at least survive. In the political 
arena a multi-state system was devised, where the most powerful and prestigious of the state 
leaders would be bestowed the title of Protector of the Zhou monarchy (ba 霸16), presiding 
over regular interstate conferences where issues were debated, and also had a role of 
commander-in-chief, tasked with punishing states who had made conquests deemed unjust 
and responding to military threats from beyond the Zhou sphere.17
Not all relations to powers outside the Central States were hostile however. The Spring and 
Autumn period also saw several ethnically and linguistically diverse political units joining the
interstate system and thus adopting the ritual system and elite culture of the Central Plains. 
These were Chu 楚 in the modern-day Hubei 湖北 province around the middle of the Yangtse
river and Wu 吳 and Yue 越 nearer to its mouth. The level of integration is evident in the fact 
that leaders of both Wu and Chu held the position of Protector during the Spring and Autumn. 
The interstate institutions had lost their importance by the Warring States period, however, as 
15 Li, 97–107.
16 Often translated as 'tyrant' or something similar, as his role was seen as an usurpation of the key royal 
prerogatives by later Confucian historiography, and the title acquired a strong negative flavor.
17 Hsu, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” 551–63.
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the number of independent states slowly declined in conquests and warfare between the 
remaining intensified.18
Looking at the internal organization of the states, major changes happened in the relations 
between the nobility on the one hand and the commoners on the other. In the Zhou system 
each landholding noble had an effectively independent realm that was a miniature version of 
his superiors'. Governmental positions were hereditary, and the lineages holding the offices 
again had their own land to govern somewhere within the realm. This made the nobles fairly 
independent, and meant that the difference between them was quantitative, not qualitative, 
making relations between the elite egalitarian in nature. As wars were fought between armies 
consisting mostly of the warrior elite, the commoners were left mostly to their own devices, 
and only the ones living close by to the cities, which were mostly centers of ritual and 
production of weaponry and luxury items, not of population, were obliged to provide for the 
urban elites.19 This started to change as the kings disappeared from the top of the hierarchy, 
the ones next in line, rulers of major states, started to compete for status, eventually taking the
title of king for themselves. This situation caused the position of the ruling lines to diverge 
from their ministers and other nobility of their state, whose position was further assailed by 
changes in administrative practices and a rising professional middle class20.
These reforms also had a major impact on the relation of state power to the masses. The 
intense warfare had meant that the demand for increased military power could not be met by 
the elite, especially as most of the states could not expand their borders easily, and thus no 
new holdings could be granted to support new warriors. So the eyes of rulers turned to the 
peasants, who started to get drafted into military service in a development that would 
culminate to the major states fielding armies several hundred thousand troops strong by the 
end of the Warring States period. This drew the farming population into the orbit of state 
power for the first time, as new administrative measures had to be developed in order to 
exploit this new reserve of military power. Censuses were completed to register population, 
codes of laws promulgated for ensuring the proper conduct and discipline of these new 
soldiers, possibly unwilling to actually march into campaigns, logistic challenges of moving 
18 Hsu, 563–65.
19 Hsu, 572.
20 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 394–97.
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supplies for such masses of people had to be met. This required new skills, and this 
requirement was met by a rising class of professionals, who were employed for their abilities, 
not for their ancestry. These bureaucratic practices originating in the military filtered into civil
administration also, and the state reached its power directly to its new subjects, who in 
addition to serving in the military, now also provided income for the state in the form of direct
taxes on production, and whose compliance also in times of peace was more and more 
ensured by criminal justice administered by state.21
This centralization of power caused the old lineage-based system to fade into the sidelines. 
Direct control of the rural populace by the state  replaced the ritual gift-giving networks that 
had redistributed revenue along the networks formed of nested lineages with taxation and the 
draft system meant that the state leaders did not depend on their noble subjects for military 
power.22 As serving administrative positions depended more and more of possessing expert 
skills, rather than the set inculcated by traditional elite education, the political space of the 
noble lineage was squeezed from both above and below and in most cases resulted in the fall 
of the lineage as the basic unit of society and replacing it with the household, individualizing 
the subjects of a state.23 In several states the most powerful lineages could leverage their 
position and managed to drive out the former ruling lineage, as happened in Confucius' home 
state Lu, where three ministerial lineages captured power from the dukes and ruled as a 
triumvirate, but for the vast majority of them the developments meant a slide into obscurity. 
The exalted position of leaders on the contrary resulted in the development of a doctrine of a 
cosmic ruler, who drew their legitimacy from the ability to mesh with the structure of the 
universe and thus ensure peace and stability in both the human and natural world.
3 Theories
My understanding of Confucius owes a lot to Robert Eno's view of early Confucianism, 
although I differ from his account in several ways that will be discussed in later chapters. Eno 
claims that Confucianism was primarily about the practice of certain ritual curriculum 
21 Hsu, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” 573–75.
22 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 60.
23 Lewis, 53.
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designed to impart a set of skills necessary for realizing the natural order present in the world,
comprising the social. All texts written by the movement were secondary to the actual rituals, 
and merely report on experiences engendered by enacting them, or justifying their 
continuation in a world that had largely moved on from the situation they had supposedly 
been instituted in during the Western Zhou dynasty. Thus the philosophical system of early 
Confucianism was not conveyed in the texts, but in concrete practice among the Ru study 
groups, such as Confucius and his disciples. This rises interesting questions about the 
interpretation of these texts. Any attempt of reading them must take into account the physical 
dimension of Ruism or risk failing to reflect the significance that they had to their 
contemporaries.24
In common with modern anthropologists and scientist of religion, the early Confucians 
recognized the power of ritual and were the among the first in China to consider it as a 
separate category of actions and thus appreciate it as a system detached from the magical 
efficacy of individual rites.25 This opened up a new level of theorizing the function of ritual 
and shifted attention from it's concrete objective, the appeasement and service of spirits, to it's
social functions that were seen to be channeled through the bodies of individual actors.26 This 
is why I will consider physical dimensions of ritual, both in the ancestral cult and in 
Confucian practice. The theoretical tools employed reflect this attention to the body.
3.1 Catherine Bell – Ritualization
Bell sees ritualization as a strategic social behavior that has, although unknowingly,  as it's 
object the production of a ritualized body, that is, a body that has developed an intuition for 
ritual. “This sense of ritual exists as an implicit variety of schemes whose deployment works 
to produce sociocultural situations that the ritualized body can dominate in some way.”27 
24 Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven, 6–8.
25 Eno, 39.
26 Lewis, The Construction of Space in Early China, 14.
27 Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, 98.
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Ritualization is not communication of social facts in a symbolically coded language, but 
production of bodies embodying these facts on one hand, and the production of these facts by 
the bodies on the other28.
This production is done by creating a spatial environment which is structured 
according to certain privileged binary oppositions projected on others in order to create a 
hierarchy of spatial schemes, where the core schemes dominate the interpretation of all others,
that generates a sense of a closed system of meaning where anything can be seen as a 
manifestation of the basic contrasts: 
Returning briefly to the example of the traditional Catholic eucharistic
meal, whole sets of oppositions emerge to dominate other sets. The 
scheme of a central or 'centered' community versus a dispersed 
population is generated as people congregate together, coming from 
different directions and situations to assemble at a specific place and 
time. When they are gathered, the scheme is overlaid with a higher 
versus lower opposition in which a raised altar and elevated host, the 
lifting and lowering of voices and eyes, as well as sequences of 
standing and kneeling, and son, all generate a contrast between a 
higher reality (spiritual) and a lower on (mundane). However, this 
scheme is overlaid in turn by an inner versus outer one when the 
higher reality is internalized through the food shared by the 
participants. Ultimately, the inner–outer scheme comes to dominate 
the oppositions of higher–lower and centered–dispersed, generating an
experience of a higher spiritual authority as an internalized reality.29
This interlocking of different categories provides a certain logic to the ritualized space and 
makes possible the association of some symbols to others, such as conflating the pairs light–
dark and good–evil. Invoking such relations creates an experience of a  coherent world, and 
thus naturalizes the hegemony embedded in privileging certain symbolic terms over others. 
This structuring of experience is not a structure, however. The relations between the 
oppositions are not resolved in ritual, but rather multiplied in an endless chain of deferral of 
meaning from one to another. This means that the structure of ritualized space molding the 
ritual agents is never closed, but defers it's signification to to the world outside it, as does the 
28 Bell, 100.
29 Bell, 101–2.
10
sctructuring action of bodies engaged in ritualization.30
All these aforementioned workings of ritualization remain unknown to it's practitioners. They 
see themselves in the act of creating new persons and influencing the world they live in, but 
how this is achieved, they know not. The power of ritual derives from the fact that the 
schemes of ritualization that constitute the sense of ritual and are expressive of it function 
simultaneously to structure the experience of the world and mold the experiencer to possess 
dispositions that guide towards effective action in a world thus structured. It thus validates 
itself, but sees this validation as coming from some more authoritative source.31 And as 
powers tend to, this one is not equally distributed. Some individuals' sense of ritual is more 
finely honed and they are able to deploy and remake these schemes more effectively thus 
having a greater influence in structuring the relationship between the community and it's 
environment and to appropriate the construction of coherent world effected through ritualized 
bodies in their interests. This enables them to negotiate power relations when the power is 
claimed to derive from some authority beyond the community, such as God, and experience 
the social order as personally empowering32.
4 Analysis
To understand how the Zhou ritual system was transformed by the Confucians, we must first 
outline it's workings. A detailed description of the Zhou ancestral veneration exists in the 
Dazhuan 大傳 and Sangfu xiaoji 喪服小記 -chapters of the Liji 禮記, but this is a later 
idealization of the system, as the Liji was only compiled in the 1st century BCE.33 It is relevant
for this study however, since the Liji reflects the view Warring States scholars had of their 
past. The schematized view was projected on to the Early Western Zhou that had come to 
represent the golden age of civilization, and could thus carry hints on what was thought to be 
desirable when it comes to ritual interaction.
30 Ibid., p.102-107
31 ibid., p. 110
32 ibid., p. 110-117
33 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 66.
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The historical reality differed from the views of later scholars. The idealization of the 
beginning of the Zhou dynasty coalesced in the narrative of kings Wen and Wu laying out the 
basis of a new ideal society on the ruins of the corrupt Shang. Actually, the Zhou, as reflected 
in the archaeological record, pretty much continued the practices of the Shang unchanged or 
with slight modifications until the mid-9th century, when demographic expansion of the elite 
had reached the point where the family gathering -style rituals became impossible, and 
significant changes were made in both lineage organization and the rituals in the so-called 
Western Zhou Ritual Reform. The resulting system is the parent of the one that is described in
the Liji.34 These drastic changes in Zhou society are completely unrecorded in the Chinese 
historiographic tradition, and have been inferred from material evidence, mostly the bronze 
objects used in the rituals and their inscriptions. Both of these approaches, the historic and the
genealogic, to the Zhou ancestral cult will be followed below. In addition, an outline of the 
social history of the dynasty will be sketched, as the evolution of the ritual system was 
responded to the social changes happening during the dynasty. 
4.1 The Idealized Structure of the Zhou Ancestral Cult as 
Presented in the Liji 禮記35
There were three fundamental categories in the account of the ancestral cult that is contained 
in the Liji: biezi 別子, zong 宗 and shu- or zhongzi 庶/衆子. The first means a 'separated son' 
and was a person who had been placed outside the cult of his progenitors and had become the 
dazu 大祖 or shizu 始祖, founding ancestor, of his own. Zong was the main line of the lineage, 
traced from the founder through eldest sons, who would lead rituals addressed to the founder, 
to which all of his living descendants participated. The others of a generation were referred as 
shu-/zhongzi, younger sons, who were the ones related to the ancestor in question in a manner 
34 Falkenhausen, 65–66. The Liji is a compilation of materials describing a government structure and rituals 
that were purported to be that of the Zhou dynasty. The compilation dates from the 1st century BCE and is 
highly schematic and idealized and filled with anachronisms. It is based on some earlier materials that have 
been interpretated through the lens of the Warring States period.
35 This subsection is based on Vandermeersch, Wangdao Ou La Voie Royale : Recherches Sur l’esprit Des 
Institutions de La Chine Archaique. Tome 1, Structures Cultuelles et Structures Familiales.
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that they were required to participate in the rituals, but had no privileged position.
In addition to this permanent cult of the founder, each lineage also contained several 
temporary ones, as the right to be sacrificed to in perpetuity was only conferred to founders of
new lineages. Other male members of the lineage maintained their personal sacrifices only for
a number of generations depending on their rank in the social hierarchy to the maximum of 
the fifth. These cults were called xiaozong 小宗, small zong, and their leadership was also 
transferred in the line of eldest sons. However, every five generations the lineage would be 
split, so that all younger brothers of the main line son would found new sub-lineages with 
lower rank than the original. Thus every member of the ranked elite sacrificed to at least their 
father and the founder of their lineage, but could be involved in as many as five cults in many 
different roles, for example: Someone could lead his brothers and their and his own children 
in the veneration of his deceased father, all the aforementioned and additionally his cousins 
and their children along with surviving paternal uncles in honoring his grandfather and 
participate in the rites of his great-grandfather and the founder officiated by the chiefs of their 
respective cults.
The case of the cult of the grandfather in the above example is interesting, because of the 
station of his younger sons, being the uncles of the chief of cult, belong to an older generation
than him, but ritually are required to treat him as an older brother in the context of the cult, 
because the chief as a continuator of the line of his predecessor inherited their ritual status. 
This led to formally defined ritual relations overriding biological ones, at least in the context 
of ritual.
4.2 The Sociopolitical Significance of the Zhou Ancestral Cult
The ritual system of the Zhou dynasty was largely inherited from the preceding Shang36. In it's
36 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 2.
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center lay ancestor veneration. We know mostly about the lineage cult of the Shang kings, but 
some evidence exist of other lineages performing sacrifices to their own ancestors also. The 
deceased kings were thought to reside in heaven along with the supreme being Shangdi 上帝, 
who was imagined as the ultimate ancestor, possibly of not only the Shang people, but also of 
others.37 The Shang ancestors were identified with the suns, of which ten were thought 
existing, and Shangdi as the polestar in the center of the celestial realm. Offerings were made 
to the ancestors identified with the sun then traversing the sky, who were then able to 
influence Shangdi, fending off disasters, or informing the rulers of it's intentions.38 Successful 
communication with the ancestors was therefore an important guarantee for the success of 
kingly endeavours such as agriculture, hunting and war.
When the Zhou conquered the Shang they legitimized their rule by claiming that Shangdi had 
changed his principal son, that is to say his inheritor from the debauching Shang line to the 
morally upright Zhou. This was ritually confirmed by cutting off the Shang from their ritual 
connection to Shangdi by the conquering king Wu of Zhou and the adoption of the sobriquet 
Tianzi 天子 by the principal heir of the Zhou royal lineage.39 It is interesting how this trope of 
adoption of replacing the heir apparent with a person selected for their merit also figures 
prominently in the stories surrounding the early mythological paragon-emperors Yao 堯 and 
Shun 舜 and is repeated in the first transfer of kingship of the Zhou, when future king Wu's 
older brother was banished and he was made the heir. Edward L. Shaughnessy has also 
posited that there would be traces of a succession dispute detectable in the early parts of the 
Shang shu 尚書40 between the Duke Zhou, who was a regent and the royal tutor of the third 
Zhou king Cheng,during the latter's infancy, supporting himself as the new ruler on basis of 
merit and the other regent Duke Shao, who sided with the precept of king Wen 文王 who had 
passed the throne to his son41.
37 Allan, “On the Identity of Shang Di 上帝  and the Origin of the Concept of a Celestial Mandate (Tian Ming 
天命),” 12–13.
38 Allan, 9.
39 Allan, 38–39.
40 Shang shu, also known as Shu jing is a collection of texts that claim to be from the Early Western Zhou. 
Some indeed are, but the majority have been composed later. The dating has been done on stylistic grounds 
and is not very precise.
41 Shaughnessy, “THE DUKE OF ZHOU’S RETIREMENT IN THE EAST AND THE BEGINNINGS OF 
THE MINISTERIAL-MONARCH DEBATE IN CHINESE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY,” 63–64.
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The senior male member of the Zhou lineage thus became the representative of the heavenly 
powers on earth, since in the ancestor veneration system it is the eldest male of the principal 
'stem' lineage that conducts the rituals that are used to communicate with the deceased part of 
the lineage, which in this case included Heaven, that had adopted the Zhou kings as its 
progeny. This meant that the religious and political orders were identical. Secular authority 
was derived from religious, and the state organization was that of the ancestral cult. This is 
was reflected in the fact that the king referred to his subjects with their personal given names, 
which were only used by parents talking to their children.42 After conquering the Shang 
territory and several surrounding polities allied with them king Wu installed his relatives and 
close allies as governors of these new domains.43 These lords were granted the right to be 
venerated by their descendants and became the founders of new lineages that were linked as 
junior branches to the royal cult. Their leaders therefore owed ritual allegiance to the 
descendant of the primary lineage, that is, the king, whose position towards them was like that
of an eldest brother officiating the cult of their forefathers.
It is not known how pervasive ancestor veneration was during the Shang and Early Zhou.  
Probably  only the ruling class of society, the lineages of the king and great feudal lords, had a
structured cult with a temple and institutional rituals. It is clear in any case that the elaborate 
system described in warring states ritual manuals only came int being in the middle 9th century
Western Zhou Ritual Reform discussed below.44 Surnames started to become more common 
also as the number of lineages multiplied, and new ways of referring to them had to be 
developed.45 Establishing a structured lineage was a privilege reserved to the greatest lords, 
mostly relatives of the king, and meant that the person whose achievements had merited it 
would have the right to be individually receiving ritual homage from all his descendants in 
perpetuity in becoming the founding ancestor of his family cult.  In addition he also gave his 
posterity rank, as status in the hierarchy of ranks was transferred along the principal line of 
descent from father to eldest son. Younger sons' position deteriorated in every generation, so 
that the younger sons of younger sons eventually descended to commonerhood, even in 
lineages of illustrious lords.
42 Vandermeersch, Wangdao Ou La Voie Royale : Recherches Sur l’esprit Des Institutions de La Chine 
Archaique. Tome 1, Structures Cultuelles et Structures Familiales, 173.
43 Brashier, Ancestral Memory in Early China, 73.
44 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 155–56.
45 Vandermeersch, Wangdao Ou La Voie Royale : Recherches Sur l’esprit Des Institutions de La Chine 
Archaique. Tome 1, Structures Cultuelles et Structures Familiales, 188–89.
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A Lineage was usually connected to a specific place. Newly instituted lords were required to 
construct an ancestral temple to host rituals to the ancestors, and the creation of ritual vessels 
for the offering of food to them there.46 This temple would have been situated in the domain 
granted to the founding ancestor to rule in virtue of his title, produce from which  guaranteed 
the continuity of the performance of the rituals, and anchored the lineage physically. The 
ability to acquire land and a title ritually confirming one's right to rule over it was therefore 
the act of ensuring ultimate longevity, bestowing eternal personal existence as long as one's 
descendants were able to hold on to the one's achievements. It can be thought that every 
ancestral cult was primarily directed at commemorating this act, that was germane to the 
station and life of his offspring.
This commemoration materialized in the inscriptions of the bronze vessels that were used to 
serve food in ritual banquets hosted by the living for the dead. The grant of a title was 
accompanied by the right to employ a certain set of these vessels, that would have been cast 
immediately after and inscribed with a record of the events. Afterwards any officially 
recognized achievements of the members of the lineage would be similarly commemorated by
casting them into bronze.47 These inscriptions were made in the interior of the vessels that 
would have been filled with victuals during the rituals and thus unreadable by the participants.
From this it can be deduced that the texts were mainly addressed to the ancestors, reporting 
the successes of their posterity.48 This impression is fortified by the fact that the inscriptions 
do not report negative events, even later during the decline of the dynasty. There is a case of a 
royal military campaign against southern barbarians, that we know from historical sources 
was a complete failure, but vessels recording it have been discovered, and they proclaim the 
glorious success of the armies.
The ancestors' existence depended on the living, so they  would have naturally  been 
interested of the actions taken by their descendants. They were not reduced to simply 
observing, however, but could also assist. This assistance was effected through their de 德. De
is often translated as power, virtue, perhaps charismatic power.49 It is a quality of persons that 
enables them to effect transformations in their surroundings, which would seem to include the
46 Liji 1258, quoted in Wu Hung, Monumentality in Early Chinese Art and Architecture.
47 Rawson, Jessica, “Ancient Chinese Ritual as Seen in the Material Record,” 46–47.
48 Rawson, Jessica, 45.
49 Brashier, Ancestral Memory in Early China, 61.
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potential unborn generations of one's posterity. Originally though, de had connotations that tie
it to land. It was the power to be remembered by establishing a lineage, which, as already 
said, entailed securing the means to support that lineage through the ages. Later generations 
were inheritors not only to the material part of the founder's de in the form of agricultural 
land, but also to the power to rule.50 The reporting of successes just discussed was a means of 
assuring the ancestors that their later progeny had not squandered either and were still capable
of upholding the original mandate ming 命 that kept the line secure. This continued transfer 
of power from the past required that the living performed their ritual duties owed to their 
forefathers impeccably, since the existence of the former was dependent on the nourishment 
provided by the food sacrifices. In other words, the ancestral cult formed a bond of 
dependency between lineage members gone and present: If the rituals stopped, the ancestors 
would cease to be able to empower the living to keep the name and title alive. 
The lineage provided it's members with the basic blocks of their identity. They had the name 
of their founder, the sought to emulate him in their life and to continue his tradition to future 
generations.51 It also anchored them to the larger Zhou society, since all the cults were 
organized under that of the royal lineage and thus defined also their political duties and 
privileges.52 The lineage system was what defined the Zhou world. It is interesting to note that
the political legitimation of the conquest of Shang had been that the first Zhou king, Wen had 
received a mandate from heaven to govern the world. The word mandate is the same that was 
used for the kings' act of bestowing favors, such as the right found a lineage, and actually 
means to name or to command. Therefore it could be thought that the Zhou conceived 
themselves to have been selected as the first lineage by heaven due to the ample de of king 
Wen and given the right to rule the land allotted to them. To sum up the preceding couple of 
paragraphs I quote from Wu Hong discussing the legendary Nine Tripods that were the 
symbol of royal authority in Zhou times:
The tripods commemorated not only the ancestors who originally 
created and acquired these ritual objects (i.e. the establishment of the 
Three Dynasties) but also all previous kings who had successfully 
maintained the Tripods in the royal temple (and had thus proved a 
50 Brashier, Ancestral Memory in Early China, 62.
51 Chang, Art, Myth, and Ritual, 41.
52 Brashier, Ancestral Memory in Early China, 68–69.
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dynasty's continuing mandate from Heaven). The political symbolism 
of the Tripods could be sustained over the several hundred years of a 
dynasty precisely because the memory of these ancestral kings was 
constantly renewed through ancestral sacrifices. Since only royal 
descendants could hold such sacrifices, any user of the Tripods was 
self-evidently the inheritor of political power.53
Since I have argued that political power flowed through the structures of the ancestral cult and
that the cults of non-royal individuals were homologous to the royal one, this characterization
can be extended to lower levels of the ranked society also.
4.3 The Development of Rituals of the Ancestral Cult 
When we think about Confucianism, we tend to treat it as ‘philosophy’, a category often seen 
to consist mainly of texts written to present, attack or defend a systematic body of 
propositions. The Lunyu is markedly lacking in any of these departments,  which has led to 
two common scholarly ways of treating it: either dismissing it as philosophy, since it fails to 
display the required characteristics, or assuming that, since it is philosophy, it must have a 
system in it, and reconstructing the supposed view of Confucius that he was unable or 
unwilling to put into writing clearly.
To me, neither of these ways are satisfactory. Both rest on a concept of philosophy defined 
genealogically as the tradition descended from the Greeks, in which logical argumentation 
modeled after the legal process was the defining characteristic of serious thinking. Such a 
view and definition of philosophy is justified, as the word itself was coined by that very 
tradition, but seeing that since at least the turn of the 20th century, a large portion of the 
descendants of the Greek thinkers have done their best to raise themselves by their bootstraps 
from the mire of metaphysics the tradition has increasingly been seen as, it seems to me that a 
53 Wu Hung, Monumentality in Early Chinese Art and Architecture, 8.
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narrow definition of philosophy such as the one above would be rejected even by many 
current practitioners in the “historical”, European philosophy. Thus it seems worthwhile to 
take a big tent -approach, especially in cases that deal with things in which the European 
tradition has been struggling with.
One such area is action. Classical Greek thought does little to bridge the gap between thought 
and its application. The Lunyu, on the contrary, seems to constantly deal with actions and the 
manner in which they are executed, to the extent that when questioned about a concept of his, 
Confucius usually recites an anecdote, rather than giving definitions or systematic overview. 
This attention to practical conduct and exemplarity has been picked up by Robert Eno in his 
The Confucian Creation of Heaven, where he describes the Warring States Confucians as 
forming “dancing societies”, where they learned the ancient rituals and modes of dress and 
speech. While I do not necessarily agree with all of Eno’s views, his insight into what he calls 
“the bifurcated doctrine” of the Ru 儒54 informs much of my own attempt at making sense of 
some positions of early Warring States Confucianism. Eno claims that the core of the Ru 
teaching was nonverbal and consisted of ritual actions: dances, music, reciting poetry, and so 
on. The written part was created only to draw in new people who hadn’t yet been able to 
experience the primary doctrine, or to defend the group against verbal attacks by 
competitors55.
As seen above, Catherine Bell places the efficacy of ritual in bodies conditioned by it, able 
both to respond to the world around them, but also to affect changes in it. This is done by 
deploying certain ritual strategies to guide the interpretation of situations in order produce 
favored outcomes. This ability to map reality on to a conceptual system, assigning singular 
events and actors as representations of larger categories, is called sense of ritual by Bell. A 
well developed sense grants a person the ability to steer the actions of their fellow humans by 
drawing on their shared understanding of the world, internalized by participation in ritual 
54 Eno uses the Chinese term ru instead of Confucian to highlight his view that Confucius was only a single 
member of a tradition that predated him. There seems to be scant evidence for the existence of the ru before 
the times of Confucius however and I stick to the anachronistic 'Confucian' in this thesis in the interest of 
making it more accessible to non-experts. Such a term did not exist in Chinese, where ru was and still is used
to refer to 'Confucianism', until late 20th century, when dangdai xin Kongzi zhuyi, was calqued from the 
english 'Contemporary Neo-Confucianism', which is used to refer to certain North-American academics, 
who advocate for social reform of western societies based on their interpretation of Confucius.
55 Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven, 30–33.
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action. Bell calls this ritualization. My aim in this section is to deploy this concept of 
ritualization to make sense of how li, ritual, was seen by the early Warring States Confucians, 
and what role it played in their educational and political programs. First, in order to map the 
changes effectuated by them, we must revisit the ritual system of earlier Zhou times that was 
the basis for this understanding of li in the light of Catherine Bell's theory of ritualization.
4.3.1 Early Western Zhou
In textual sources predating the Warring States era li refers to concrete ceremonies related 
either to the practices of the ancestral cult or sacrifices to local spirits by rulers of smaller 
political units, or universal spirits by the king.56 As already seen above, these events were 
intrinsic to the Zhou political order, but not only as  its expression, they also were 
instrumental in producing it. As there were significant changes to the rituals around the 
middle of the 9th century BCE, referred to in scholarly literature as the Western Zhou ritual 
reform, I will discuss the situations before and after separately.
The ritual practices in the beginning of the dynasty formed a strong continuity with the Shang,
as can be expected, the Zhou being a member of the Shang cultural sphere. In the ancestral 
cult the basic ritual unit was the sacrificial feast, where living members of a lineage gathered 
to feed and remember the deceased.57 The central divisions of this ritual performance can be 
analyzed as past/future and us/them. The past of the lineage was represented by the ancestors, 
of whom most recent ones were still conceived in personal terms, but their individuality 
gradually faded to a collective membership in the “ancestral college”, apart from the founder, 
who was personally remembered.58 Similarly, a path towards the future was laid out in the 
ritual, as the head of the cult was the eldest member of the major line of descent, from father 
to eldest son, within the cult, his children and probably grandchildren would have been 
present leading off to the future. The moment of ritual was therefore a bridge between the past
and the future, a now of ritual time where both existed and extended and depended from. 
56 Nikkilä, Early Confucianism and Inherited Thought in the Light of Some Key Terms of the Confucian 
Analects. 2, The Terms in the Confucian Analects, 109–12.
57 Rawson, “Western Zhou Archaeology,” 386–87.
58 Brashier, Ancestral Memory in Early China, 60–66.
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The past was renewed by remembrance of the events of the founding of the lineage and 
celebration of the deeds of the founder, but that memory would only last if the descendants 
could prove worthy of them and attain the standard set by him. The ritual feast was laid out as
a proof of the prowess of the living members, as it consisted of grain and liquor fermented 
from it, derived from the land won by the founder, and meat representing the continuation of 
his ability to conquer, as hunting and war were considered to be essentially the same thing. In 
preparing the sacrificial feast, the living signaled that the heritage of the ancestors is in good 
hands and that they were worthy of the continuing support of their ancestors. The culmination
of the ceremony featured the body of the son or grandson of the cult leader, and the future 
leader himself, who becoming a host for the ancestral spirits descending from heaven to enjoy
the banquet and bridging the past/future -dichotomy concretely by in-corporating the past 
within the future and vice versa59。
This way the rituals of the ancestral cult very concretely manifested the groups an individual 
was a part of, as relatives gathered to remember their kin. Brothers paid respect to their father 
together, cousins to their grandfather and so forth. It it very probable that the spatial 
arrangements at the temple further reflected the relations between the participating relatives, 
as well as their relation to the founder and the major lineage. There were however also  
differentations both more subtle and fundamental in play in the rituals. The major one was the
one between ‘we Zhou’ and the rest of the world. This was always present, as all the lineage 
founders were incorporated into the Zhou royal house’s cult at the time of the founding of the 
dynasty, making the kings Wen and Wu the ultimate founding ancestors to everybody else in 
the Zhou realm. The Shang kings’ lineage, who were allowed to continue rituals to their own 
ancestors, was the exception. Thus in celebrating the conquests of their own ancestors, the 
celebrants also paid remembrance to the Zhou conquest of Shang and the founding and 
legitimacy of the dynasty.60
A further manifestation of the us/them -divide was in what was sacrificed. As mentioned 
above, the sacrifice was of grain and meat, and it is the latter that provides insight into the 
drawing of the lines between friends and enemies. The Zhou elite was essentially a warrior 
aristocracy, and its most important duty was the provision of sacrificial victims to its temples, 
59 Brashier, 314.
60 Li, Early China, 146–47.
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as this was the only way of maintaining legitimate rule over the land that their lineage had 
been granted. The concrete offerings consisted of both domesticated animals and ones killed 
during large ceremonial hunts. Hunting was conceptually linked to warfare, and the catch was 
designated with the same term as prisoners captured on the battlefield. Both hunts and 
military campaigns started in the ancestral temple, where blessings of the ancestors were 
sought, and also ended there with the reporting of the successes in the field and the 
presentation of the spoils. Part of the meat from both occasions would be distributed in the 
network of individual ancestral cults both to parent lineages, from which the lineage in 
question had split, and also to dependent sub-lineages branching off from them. This created 
an expanding circle of “us” whose status was confirmed by the gifting of the sacrificial meat. 
In essence it was a message, “You are safe, we will not feed you to our ancestors.” Anyone 
outside this ritually acknowledged circle of non-aggression was fair game, both 
metaphorically and literally. Noteworthy is that alien humans were ritually indistinguishable 
from animals. Thus the us/them distinction was marked in who ate and who were eaten in the 
ancestral cult rituals.61
This is not to say that cannibalism was commonplace in the Western Zhou. Human enemies’ 
slaughter was enough for the ancestors, and usually only ears or heads would be brought back 
to the temple as tokens. However, live captives were also used as victims in rituals, which is 
an another continuation of Shang practice, although it seems to lose favor in time during the 
Zhou.62 Later Confucian historiography tried to erase the violence inherent in the Zhou 
system, as it was elevated to a golden age of civilization and high morality, and human 
sacrifice did not fit the image. For example, the story of king Wu’s conquest of Shang in the 
Shang shu mentions that when his troops entered the Shang capital, their weapons were clean,
not bloodied from battle, as it was ultimately the virtue of the kings that decided the outcome, 
not arms. The version preserved in the Lost Documents of Zhou (Yi Zhou shu 逸周書) tells of 
rivers running red, piles of heads taken back to the kings’ ancestral temple and king Wu 
personally desecrating the corpse of the last Shang king Zhou before presenting it at the altar 
as a proof of his success.63 Thus it can be said that a major function of the Western Zhou ritual
system was the direction of aggression inherent in the warrior culture of the elites towards 
61 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 17–30.
62 Lewis, 27–28.
63 Lewis, 27–28.
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victims outside of it, and so maintaining peaceful relations between those participating in it. 
The outsiders were comparable to animals – a resource to be harvested in the quest of 
preservation of lineage integrity and control of land.
The ritual obligation required symbolically re-enacting the original conquest of which the 
founding ancestor had been a part. This heroic original act was seen as shining from the 
darkness of history  into which most events and persons have fallen after they have 
disappeared from living memory. Thus the rituals shine the  light of remembrance on the 
deeds of the ancestors, who in turn are the very thing that makes the ritual possible.64 It is 
therefore no surprise that written history evolved out of ancestral cult practices. Recounting 
the lineage history and reporting the successes of the current generations to the ancestors and 
also to future generations was a central practice of the cults, and in order to better perform 
this, the stories were committed into writing on a medium combining permanence and ritual 
significance: bronze. The vessels and bells used in the rituals therefore assumed an another 
role of assuring the ancestors that they were still remembered, and that their descendants were
guarding their inheritance well65. 
The orderly performance of ritual thus assures its continuation into the future, making it bright
and knowable. So it would seem that the light/dark -pair does not map on to the past/future 
simply, but that both the past and the future can be thought as either, depending on whether 
they are considered from their general unknowability, or from the specific living history of a 
lineage. It is as if the light is actually emanating from the ritual now, and reflected by the 
succession of ascendants and descendants participating in it through the ritual, both dependent
on it for their very existence. As such, this conceptual pair escapes simple dichotomic 
mapping of value, and therefore calls for attention to itself. The fault of the duality seen as 
central to ritual schemas of reality by Bell is of course the fact that any such classification 
always leaves something out of the complexity of reality, as discussed by Jacques Derrida,66 
that resists the limitations to its infinite and subtle possibilities by strict structures. Derrida 
also points out that this remainder is a key to progressing beyond these  simplifications, and 
thus to a fuller engagement with texts.
64 Brashier, Ancestral Memory in Early China, 331–32.
65 Rawson, “Western Zhou Archaeology,” 364.
66 Derrida, De La Grammatologie.
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How then are we to view the ritual time of the ancestral cult? That the historical aspect was 
important has already been seen, but the history is very different from the scientific 
connotations that we are wont to attach to the word. The history of the lineages was 
thoroughly subsumed into their function, the continued possession of land and power. The 
inscriptions reporting the deeds of the members never mention any negative performances. 
Even the vessels cast after the catastrophic southern expedition of king Zhao, eulogize the 
heroic deeds of the survivors and fail to mention the greatest military defeat known to the 
dynasty so far.67 Thus events that were brought into the history had to conform to the 
predetermined structure of that history, that was the successful continuation of the tradition of 
the founder. Therefore the cultic history was not chronicling events happening, but rather re-
enacting the mythical origin of the cult and lineage. The future also was construed as an 
infinite repetition of the mythical past brought to life by the ritual performance, illustrated by 
the ending formula of the inscriptions found on vessels “Let sons and grandsons use it for 10 
000 years!” Thus the duality inherent in the conception of time is not between the past and the
present, but rather between the eternity of the cult and the transitoriness of everything else.
This temporal divide is mirrored by a spatial one, as aptly described by Wu Hung:
Let us take an imaginary journey to a Three Dynasties68 temple. First, 
we enter the town whose tall walls block off the outside. We then walk
towards the center where a palace-temple compound stands, again 
blocked by walls or corridors. Our feeling of secrecy is gradually 
heightened as we enter the temple yard and penetrate layers of halls 
leading to the shrine of the founder of the clan, located at the end of 
the compound. At last, we enter the shrine; in the dim light, numerous 
shining bronze vessels, decorated with strange images and containing 
ritual offerings, suddenly loom before us. We find ourselves in a 
mythical world, the end of our journey where we would encounter the 
Origin – the Shi. The ritual vessels, hidden deep inside the temple 
compound, would provide us with the means to communicate with the
invisible spirits of the ancestors – to present offerings and to ascertain 
their will.69
67 Sena, “Arraying the Ancestors in Ancient China,” 71.
68 The Three Dynasties refers to the three pre-imperial dynasties of Xia, Shang and Zhou. The Xia dynasty is 
largely absent from current historical records, but varyingly attached to certain archaeological cultures 
predating the Shang.
69 Wu, “FROM TEMPLE TO TOMB,” 83–85.
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As the ritual time is insulated from the outside, the ritual space is cut off from the external 
world, both curling around the same center, the origin. But for all the walls, physical and 
conceptual, this core is nevertheless wholly dependent on what lies beyond it, as actual 
descendants living in the world of outside of the eternal return of sacred history recreate the 
ritual time-space by exploiting resources found outside the walls of the city, grain, grown by 
those subject to it, and as already seen, meat, provided by the prowess of the lineage members
conquering the world still outside, but potentially transferable to, the sacred order created by 
the rituals.
Although the ritual order elevated the eternal and inside as superior members of their 
respective conceptual pairs, from the above we can clearly see their complete dependence on 
their inferior counterparts. The lineage's city seat was parasitic on the countryside around it, 
as the unchanging ancestral reality required the descendants to adapt themselves to the 
concrete situations at hand in order to preserve it. Thus the ritual order, while defining a 
territory, and a  group of people that ruled over it, actually depended on the crossing of these 
boundaries by certain bodies, and their transformation into something else. The process is 
more concrete in the bodies of victims for the sacrifices, as they were prepared by cooking 
them into food, the outsider thus sustaining both the spirits of the ancestors and the bodies of 
contemporaries. But the metaphor of cooking can be applied for the treatment of time also, the
events in the real world transformed by certain recipes into a form acceptable to the ancestors,
and thus to society in general. This metaphoric connection between cuisine and civilization is 
well attested in European languages, the French 'brut' referring to materials or beings 
unworked by civilizing influence of any kind, that is being raw. The same applies for Finnish, 
where 'raaka' is raw both in the sense of uncooked and brutal, and 'kypsä' cooked, but also 
mature, well-developed. Thus we can see how cooking is employed to bring the 
undifferentiated chaotic world under the auspices of civilization by processing it into  
palatable form.
The wholesome influence of this processing of raw materials was extended from the 
individual lineage to the larger society along the lines of ritual exchange of meat as seen 
above, where the spoils of war and hunting converted into nourishment for the ancestors and 
living individuals were again put to work on the level of the larger body politic of the whole 
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Zhou world flowing up and down along the nested hierarchy of prestige.70 This movement that
forms the political structure is essentially of leftovers, and the meal and who gets to eat what 
and in which order defines the relations between social actors. The ritual meal is prepared for 
the ancestors, who hold primacy and thus are allowed to partake of it first. As they consume 
only the scent, the rest is left to living humans, who eat their fill, and the rest is spread to other
lineages according to the relative positions in the hierarchy of cults. Thus the civilizing 
influence of cooking conquers the outer world, and by doing so nourishes ones own both 
literally and metaphorically.71
To sum up, what kind of bodies were the product of these Early Zhou ancestral cult rituals 
then? As the dynasty was founded in conquest, and the founders of the lineages granted their 
privileges due to their part in that campaign, their descendants were bound to remember and 
emulate these deeds due to the historical consciousness evolving in the cults, thus extending 
the ideal of the warrior through the generations. Martial merit was required to uphold the 
legitimacy of rule. These factors worked with the incentive to achieve an undying reputation, 
as this was the only way to achieve personal immortality and also to further the preservation 
of ones lineage, which of course was also a requisite of being remembered. All the while there
was an inbuilt mechanism for tempering this inculcation of aggression, as the rituals also 
encouraged its direction outwards, against beings excluded from the ancestral cult network. 
This was achieved by the fact that every lineage’s history stemmed from the original conquest
of the kings, who were granted the world to rule by heaven. Therefore “All land is the king’s 
land”, and the sustenance each lineage drew from their allotment ultimately depended on the 
king. This created a ritual line between the Zhou and the outside, who were designated 
legitimate targets for aggression and sources of sustenance for the political order.
4.3.2 Middle Western Zhou Ritual Reform
The politico-ritual system of the early Zhou started to run into problems after the first couple 
of hundred years of the dynasty. One reason was demographical: The start of the Zhou had 
70 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 30.
71 Cf. Dearmitt, ”Cascade of Remainders”.
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seen large military campaigns against peoples surrounding the Shang realm expanding the 
area ruled by the dynasty, which had kept the elite population in check due to casualties, and 
also provided new land to distribute to any surplus growth. The long peaceful period 
following the initial expansion accelerated population growth and depleted the land resources 
available to establish new lineages or reward old ones. Together these factors meant that a rise
in status became harder and harder to achieve, which would intensify competition for it. It 
also weakened the royal lineage, which became more and more dependent on its subordinates 
for military strength as well as faced its first succession disputes.72 This development 
eventually led to the fall of the Western Zhou dynasty and the kings’ migration east and 
relegation to a figurehead role in Zhou politics.73
The archaeological record shows a rapid change in both the composition and style of the ritual
paraphernalia recovered from tombs dated to the 9th century BCE,74 a time when the fortunes 
of the dynasty were turning due to internal reasons described in the above paragraph, but 
coinciding with increased military pressure from non-Zhou peoples north and east from 
them.75 The changes are prefigured by developments in the eastern Zhou satellite states during
the preceding century, while the bronzes from the Zhou heartland remain relatively 
unchanged. This would suggest a cultural and possibly political fragmentation of the Zhou 
realm, while epigraphic evidence from the time indicate the possibility of two different kings 
reigning simultaneously and a long period of regency in the capital. These factors led to the 
changes known as the Western Zhou Ritual Revolution or Reform, the former term coined by 
the art historian Jessica Rawson on the basis of analysis of the changes in decoration and form
of the ritual bronzes dated to this era and the latter used by the archaeologist Lothar von 
Falkenhausen.76 The theory has received further confirmation from studying changes in the 
ensembles of grave goods interred with elite individuals.77 The historical records available to 
us mostly do not mention these changes, and it is probable that in the Springs and Autumns 
period the post-reform ritual system was projected backwards in time to cover the whole 
dynasty. This was due to a general shift of focus. As the dynasty faced difficulties in its 
72 Li, Landscape and power in early China, 115–16; 122-25.
73 Li, 233–34.
74 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 29–30.
75 Li, Landscape and Power in Early China, 149–58.
76 Rawson, Jessica, “Ancient Chinese Ritual as Seen in the Material Record.” Rawson is currently also 
referring to the events as a reform, see “Rawson, Ordering the Exotic”, 6
77 RAWSON, “ORDERING THE EXOTIC,” 11–16.
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present, it increasingly turned to its illustrious past for legitimation. In the following 
paragraphs I will chart these changes and how they changed the focus of ritual and the kinds 
of actions and identities encouraged by it.
Rawson’s central finding was that during the mid-9th century BCE the ritual vessels grew in 
size, their outline became more contoured and their surface decoration simplified radically. 
All these changes contributed to make them more amenable to looking at from a further 
distance. The Shang and Early Zhou cult had centered around the ceremonial meal, during 
which food and wine was served out of the vessels, and the participants would have been 
close to them to admire the intricate patterns cast on the surfaces. Also, the vessels had been 
of fairly similar size to their everyday ceramic counterparts, as they served the same purpose, 
tableware, although in a elevated context. The post-reform vessels by contrary impressed 
mainly by their size and arrangement in homogenous sets, dropping most of the surface detail.
It can be surmised that these stylistic changes were made due to a shift in ritual practices that 
warranted the new forms, rather than simple drift in aesthetic tastes of the Zhou elites, 
especially as they were adopted extremely quickly over the entire Zhou world.78
In addition to the changes in the vessels themselves, the way they were produced and 
deployed also changed. Before, vessels were cast to commemorate an event important to the 
lineage, such as a royal reward or a marriage. The vessel would often bear an inscription 
describing the circumstances and its intended use.  Thus the vessels available to a lineage 
would have been a mix of types commissioned by different members in different times.79 Each
would also have been individually designed by presumably the artisans whose duty the 
casting was in the polity where it was made. This is indeed the the case of excavated 
assemblies from unlooted graves. A single grave can contain pieces of vastly different ages 
and also ones originating from far away, received as gifts or looted in war. After the reform all
this changes. Firstly the designs of the vessels were standardized into a narrow range and 
many types that had been in use from early Shang times were discontinued and some new 
were created. Secondly, the vessels started to be made in sets, each belonging to a single 
person. Within a set each vessel was nearly identical to other ones of its type, generally only 
their size varied so that they formed a slowly diminishing series. The sets themselves were 
78 Rawson, “Western Zhou Archaeology,” 434–38.
79 Rawson, 435.
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again standardized according to the social status of the owner so that everybody used the same
types of vessels, but higher ranking persons had more of each type.80  
It is possible that these changes were only stylistic, and that the rituals the implements were 
used for remained the same, but assuming the opposite seems more reasonable to me. After 
all, why go through the trouble of disseminating new designs and casting massive amounts of 
extremely expensive luxury products, while making obsolete a large part of  the ones already 
existing just to keep doing what was already been done. So I presume that changes in 
ideological level were made at the same time that necessitated the new forms.81 The speed of 
the spread of the changes and the uniformity achieved over the entire Zhou world suggests 
that they were consciously designed and promulgated. From these starting points we can start 
hypothesizing the conditions, motivations and aims of the new rituals.
Tackling the question of the design of the individual vessels first, the changes suggest that 
they were intended to impress from a further distance, as suggested by their increased size and
lack of surface detail. As we can remember from above, the ritual vessels of the early Zhou 
were sequestered in the inner sanctums of the ancestral temple, where they served as an 
unperishing record of the lineage history as well as implements for nourishing the ancestors. 
The new vessels' shapes as well as their organization in matching sets seems to suggest a 
primary function of impressing and display,82 especially as each person seems to have had 
their own set that would be buried with them, thus negating the archival properties that the 
pre-reform vessels had, and indeed in the Eastern Zhou, long inscriptions on ritual bronzes 
would be rare. The increased size of the bronzes also meant that several people would have 
been required to move them,83 which would suggest a much more static role of a display piece
in the ritual performances.
The assemblages of vessels in sets and their uniformity in design also point to the possible 
changes in their use. Before status of a lineage would have been displayed by the ingenuity 
and ancient provenance of the individual bronzes they would be able to deploy in their rituals,
80 Rawson, “Ordering the Material World of the Western Zhou,” 8.
81 Both von Falkenhausen and Rawson agree. See Society in the Age of Confucius, 48-51; “Western Zhou 
Archaeology”, 433-435. 
82 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 48.
83 Rawson, “Western Zhou Archaeology,” 434.
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as the vessels cast by lower status individuals would be plainer, but the after Reform 
differences between them would amount to the number of vessels they used and their size, 
both easily perceived from a distance, without needing to study them up close to appreciate 
fine decoration or ancient inscriptions. All in all the picture emerging seems to point to a 
increasing static character of the rituals and a concern for clear indications of relative status' 
of individuals and lineages. The former is further supported by a change in the composition of
the vessel assemblages. As stated above, many individual types of bronzes fell out of use, and 
most of these were connected with serving and drinking alcoholic beverages. They were 
mostly replaced with food vessels, suggesting reduced importance of drinking and inebriation,
which would again suggest a shift to more “apollonarian” practices. There is also some 
historical and epigraphic evidence of an attempt to reduce drinking alcohol, which was seen 
as a Shang practice that contributed to that dynasty's moral bankruptcy and fall84.
These changes would make sense from a perspective of the Zhou kings at the time. The 
increased focus on status and uniformity can be seen as an attempt to bring order to their 
realm that had been increasingly drifting apart during the last century or so, due to reasons 
stated above. A further component in the Reform contributing to this interpretation is its 
deliberate use of archaism. This is evident in the shapes of the new vessels, that were modeled
after early Zhou precedent, although the details were changed as above, and also in their 
inscriptions which employ a form of language also borrowing elements of the beginning of 
the dynasty, while also displaying the same reduction of individualism and repetition of set 
formulae that mirrors the development of the bronzes' form.85 These references to the past 
glory and supposed unity of the dynasty under the founding kings only make sense if posited 
in a reality where all that had been put to question. Thus the Reform seems to have been an 
attempt at restoring the royal control over the Zhou realm by adopting a new way of ritually 
performing the past of the dynasty. While it was successful in disseminating these changes, 
ultimately they were not powerful enough to reverse the centrifugal forces driving the 
dissolution of the realm. It did leave an impression of cultural unity in both the material and 
ideological planes however, that might have been the inspiration for the Confucian political 
program.
84 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 48–49.
85 Rawson, “Western Zhou Archaeology,” 438–39.
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Interestingly, the ritual developments are paired with administrative ones. There is a 
significant change in bronze inscriptions from the Zhou royal domain during the Middle 
Western Zhou period. As seen above, earlier bronzes recorded mostly military victories as a 
basis for the royal favors received by the casters of the bronzes, but these disappear almost 
completely in the era under discussion and are replaced by records of appointments to the 
royal government. Formerly the offices had been hereditary and held by the brothers or uncles
of the ruling king, and while these higher officeholders remain, new minor positions below 
them as well as some entirely new branches of government were created and staffed with 
personal appointees, without considerations heredity. There is also evidence of career 
progression, with initial service in junior positions or as assistants of higher officials for some 
years, followed by a nomination for a more independent role.86 This development corresponds
with the cessation of military conquest after the founding of the dynasty, which would have 
meant that new land was no longer available to reward services for the kings. Thus alternative
solutions might have been sought, and as the royal officials had traditionally held ritual rank 
above the rulers of the eastern satellite states, integrating the new elite generations into the 
administration might have been a way of keeping up the distribution of prestige by the 
monarchy that was running out of its traditional resources. Notably, this bureaucratization of 
government did not take place in the eastern states, where hereditary ministers assisted the 
rulers well into the Spring and Autumn period. This fits well into the hypothesis presented 
above, as the states had ample room to expand on the Northern China Plain, and thus 
competition for land was not as extreme at this point as it was in the western royal domain.
As the Ritual Reforms were adopted first in the west, some time after the developments 
described in the last paragraph had been underway, we could surmise that they were an 
answer to some new social effects of them. Assuming that an increase in administrative rank 
would have corresponded with rising ritual rank too, we can see how the capability of the old 
ritual system to perform and indicate the relative importance of individuals would have been 
challenged, as an appointment could elevate one to a more exalted position than what would 
have been customary from ones lineage background. The focus on easy determination and 
display of social prestige in the Reformed ritual system would have no doubt been useful in 
navigating the increasingly complex and malleable social structure of the royal domain. Or, it 
86 Li, Early China, 148–49.
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could have been an attempt to curb the increasing tendency to social mobility and return to the
old hereditary statuses by marking them more clearly. The fact that the developments seem to 
have been underway in some of the eastern states before the adoption of reforms in the Zhou 
capital areas could favor the latter option. Either way, the motivation can be plausibly seen as 
stemming from social developments.
There is a shift in the attention of the ancestors evident in these changes also. While earlier 
they were mostly concerned with the continuing martiality of their successors, now their 
interest seems to lay in more civil matters. It is of course the living who define what the 
ancestors want to see, but it is still remarkable that where only some decades earlier, reports 
would be of numbers of enemies and cattle captured in battle, they now listed entrusting the 
inspection of royal storehouses to a descendant. No doubt this is a sign of a profound change 
in the self-understanding of the elites, and while it wasn't complete, as military action 
continued to be occasionally reported, the shift in the arena where social competition was 
acted out was major. As well as new activities, these reforms also introduced new competitors.
As a persons status had been conferred by their lineage and their position within it, both 
determined by birth, any attempts at raising that status would have been directed through the 
lineage, thus also assisting ones relatives. The possibility of individual appointments changed 
this however, as it became possible to seek fame and recognition for oneself, rather than 
glorifying the lineage and ultimately its founding ancestor. This might have been a factor 
contributing to the dissolution of the lineage as a basic building block of society.
Having described the social developments that led to the ritual reform and described some of 
its outward manifestations left to us, what about the changes in the realm of ideology then, 
what did it mean? To recap the analysis of the pre-reform system above, its main function was
to maintain the lineages by ensuring the transmission of de of the founders to their current 
descendants. The help of the ancestors was solicited by remembering their deeds and 
modeling oneself after them, proof of which was the continued delivery of sacrificial victims 
in form of enemies captured or slain in battle, or animals killed in hunts. Both of these classes 
of victims were ritually equivalent and served to divide the world into a nonhuman part used 
to provide for, and a human part defined by the participation in the Zhou lineage cult network 
defined by ritually eating and circulating the meat sourced from without. This was the 
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material aspect of de that, for Zhou political philosophy, conceptually originated in heaven, 
that had bestowed it to the kings' line, that enabled them to rule, as already seen. The effect of 
possessing this power manifested itself as making the kings 'bright' (ming) and 'terrible' (wei), 
both also properties of heaven itself. The connection of de to terror is interesting considering 
my interpretation of the root of the ancestral cult being in ritual violence, and is strengthened 
by the fact that in Shang sources its meaning is closely connected to both sacrifice and 
warfare, forming part of a complex of words relating to capturing and ritually killing 
victims.87 As the Zhou seem to have adopted both the writing and ritual systems of the Shang 
with few alterations, I see no reason not to assume continuity in the meaning of de across the 
transition. Thus the potential to rule and the potential to kill seem to be covered by the same 
concept, which would no doubt explain why terror was a product of possessing this power.
During the Western Zhou however, the connotations of de seem to change. As the dynasty's 
initial expansion passed and the long peaceful period commenced, the physical threat and 
terror attached to it seem to recede and be replaced, or at leas supplemented, with fascination, 
an irresistible pull it exerted to the rest of the world. This can of course be seen as a 
sublimation of a very concrete physical pull towards the altars of Zhou effected on the Shang 
kings, rebels and other threats to their rule by the kings. This ability to attract was manifested 
in the institution of visits to the court by subordinates. The regional lords were required to pay
visits to the king, who would feast them and provide gifts, thus affirming the relationship and 
loyalty of his subjects. The extension of hospitality an extension of the provision of meat from
the ancestral temple discussed above, and served to communicate the peaceful relation 
between the two lineages.88 Initially this circle of hospitality defined the Zhou realm, and 
polities lying outside were identified as those not coming to court (bu ting fang). In the early 
period, hostile outsiders were subdued and Zhou regional states installed to control their 
territories, but after the beginning of the dynasty either due to shift in policy, or simply lack of
military power, this model of expansion was abandoned by the Zhou and replaced with 
tributary relations, where action was taken only against those refusing to provide the court 
with items of luxury production.89 This can be seen as a new interpretation of the necessity of 
“eating” the outside world into a more symbolical plane, where the power of the kings is more
87 Kryukov, “Symbols of Power and Communication in Pre-Confucian China (on the Anthropology of de) 
Preliminary Assumptions,” 325–26.
88 Khayutina, “Royal Hospitality and Geopolitical Constitution of the Western Zhou Polity,” 11–28.
89 Khayutina, 28–37.
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latent, subjugating potential enemies by force other than military and the “flesh” provided is 
more cultural in nature as the incorporation of exotic luxuries into the Zhou ritual sphere 
proved the symbolic dominion over its surroundings90.
This import of foreign artifacts into ritual contexts is increasingly visible from the late part of 
the Middle Western Zhou onward,9192 foreshadowing the ritual reforms by about fifty years 
and coincides with the troubles in the monarchy. This would imply a situation where the 
increasingly independent regional rulers would have turned away from the royal lineage as a 
source of prestige and legitimation for their rule and attempted to increase their standing by 
manifesting their de by their ability to attract “foreigners” to themselves. The foreignness of 
the Zhou states themselves must also be considered. In their inception they were essentially 
military outposts with some Zhou and former Shang subjects imported in addition to the 
governing lineage itself, surrounded by indigenous populations. By time it stands to reason 
that there must have been accommodations on both sides to form some kind of hybrid 
cultures, especially as it is known that the Zhou favored finding marriage partners from their 
surrounding polities, thus creating diplomatic links.93 The increase in “exotic” materials can 
therefore be seen as localization of the Zhou culture happening in areas that were increasingly
independent of the royal heartlands. This cultural drift might have been an another reason for 
the reforms, as standardizing the ritual expression could have been seen as critical to the unity
of the Zhou realm, although some features of the new ritual system were adopted foreign 
influences, perhaps as a compromise designed to make the new practices more acceptable to a
ever wider range of subjects.
This new approach to signaling de created a novel situation, the accumulation of the outside 
within the community supposedly defined by the kings' de. While in the earlier conception of 
ritual relations, the matter brought in to feed the Zhou was consumed, or presented to other 
lineages for consumption, the acts of conquest and gift were enough to manifest de, now the 
symbolic ingestion of artifacts and cultural influences led to accumulation, which leads to 
inequality. Thus it became possible to amass prestige, without a clear way of redistributing it 
to match possessions to the traditional hierarchy. It also softened the borders of the ritual 
90 RAWSON, “ORDERING THE EXOTIC,” 72.
91 Rawson, 1999
92 RAWSON, “ORDERING THE EXOTIC,” 7.
93 Rawson, “Ordering the Material World of the Western Zhou,” 7.
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regime, since the new foci of prestige were shared with the outsiders, which meant that there 
were now commensurate gradations of social status within and without the Zhou world, while 
before the outsiders had been worthy only as a source of sustenance.
Now we can see the aims of the ritual reforms arising out of these developments. The 
reinforcement of social order and gradations of rank that had been blurred by alternative 
sources of prestige and the reinstallment of the Zhou kings into the center of the ritual and 
political system. Materially this was achieved by creating a new set of definite measures of 
rank in the new set of ritual implements. Aesthetically they formed a break with the tradition, 
meaning that antiques and exotic items, formerly of great prestige, could not be substituted, 
meaning that everybody was on the same level playing field. While being a break with the 
tradition and current trends, the new styles also referenced the past in the pursuit of ritually re-
centering the Zhou, as many of the vessel shapes were throwbacks to the beginning of the 
dynasty.94 The fact that the new types were almost instantly adopted in the royal domain, 
shows that they were a conscious redesign that originated in the royal government.95 This 
created a link by which anyone accepting the new ritual style, would also be affirming the 
centrality and legitimacy of the monarchy, which indeed happened as the new bronze types 
were in use all over the Zhou world within some decades. The identification of the reform 
with the kings also reinforced the compromised boundary between the in- and outsides, as it 
renewed the ritual language binding the Zhou lineages together and also provided a reminder 
of the true measure of social rank.
The new system promoted social harmony that had became increasingly important in the 
political rhetoric of the time leading to the reforms, possibly due to lack of it in the actual 
social situation. The Shi Qiang pan 盤, a bronze vessel cast around 900 BCE by  royal scribe, 
shi 史,  called Qiang of a lineage named Wei, or possibly a sub-lineage of it, famous for its 
long inscription recounting the history of the Zhou royal house in tandem with the Wei 
lineage. It starts with telling that King Wen first harmonized his government and heaven 
responded by sending its de down, which enabled Wen to unite all countries of the world. This
revised the earlier conception of the conquest as the original event in the history of the 
dynasty and the manifestation of the de of the royal line, again reflecting the changing view of
94 Rawson, “Western Zhou Archaeology,” 439.
95 Rawson, 439.
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the nature of de as a charismatic power to elicit cooperation peacefully rather than subdue 
with might. A similar development is visible in the relation between the royal lineage and 
their subjects, which formerly had been channelled through the founding ancestor's 
participation in the original conquest and division of its spoils, but increasingly was seen 
through continued obedient service to the kings throughout generations, each one responsible 
for renewing the fealty directly, instead of simply modeling the first ancestor96.
To sum up some features of the ritual reform, we see that it aimed at standardizing ritual 
expression that had diverged over the Zhou realm, while reminding subjects of the centrality 
of the royal lineage and especially the momentousness of the feats performed by the founding 
kings Wen and Wu and thus their exalted position among the world, thus propping the 
position of their descendants also.97 While the figure of the king was enlarged, his authority 
was also transposed to a more abstract level from the direct threat of violence behind the 
legitimation of rule prevalent earlier in the dynasty. This absrtactness was reflected in the 
reformed ritual practice, which also transformed from wilder, more direct and personal rites 
inherited from the Shang, to a variety that sought to display and exemplify the charismatic 
power to generate order and deference that was now increasingly seen as the root of the 
capability to rule. Discussing the ritual reforms, von Falkenhausen states that they “suggest a 
ritual environment that had, by ca. 850 BC, become less concerned with religious experience 
than with correct performance.”98 He also suggests that the historical documents depicting the 
founding of the dynasty found in the Shang shu and Shi jing 詩經99, would date from this 
period, as the descriptions contained in them reflect similar mythologization of the founding 
kings, instead of being faithful records of speeches and actions performed earlier. Therefore 
they can, at leas tentatively, be used as source material describing the post-reform rituals.
It is not possible to present a detailed analysis of the pertinent Shi jing -odes within the 
confines of this study, but I will comment on three general trends immediately visible in the 
Zhou song -section and the first third of the Da ya that contains material about King Wen.100 
96 Sena, “Arraying the Ancestors in Ancient China,” 74–75.
97 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 157.
98 Falkenhausen, 156.
99 The Shi jing, or Classic of Poetry is a collection of poetry from the Zhou dynasty comprising about 300 
individual poems. The anthology existed in some form during the time of Confucius, although the 
transmitted edition dates from the 2nd century BCE.
100 The Song is generally considered to contain lyrics of songs sung in sacrificial rituals, while the Da ya is 
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The first is the picture painted of the rituals of the royal ancestral cult in the Song.101 We see 
multitudes of people, assistants, princes, royals bustling about their separate duties arranging 
paraphernalia and performing certain parts of the rituals. All the while the solemnity and 
orderliness of the proceedings is being stressed. The spirits are described as descending to 
appreciate the performance as an audience, not as participants. We are clearly far from the 
feast of earlier times where the spirits participated directly through the intermediary of the 
body of the impersonator102.
Second feature I want to draw attention to is the focus on grain and agriculture.103 It is the 
successful harvest that enables the Zhou to properly serve their ancestors, not hunting or war. 
Sacrificial bulls are mentioned, but they originate within the cultivated sphere of civilization, 
not in the wild. Agriculture is also credited a civilizing action in relation to humans as odes 
290 and 291 describe the coordinated action of masses of people required for sowing, 
harvesting and converting wildlands into fields. Thus we can see how the symbolic 
appropriation of the world external to civilization has been moved from the violence and 
individual glory of the hunt into the cooperation necessitated by efficient large scale 
agriculture with a concomitant change in the perception of rulership. The third feature ties 
into the second one above through the figure of Houji, the mythical primal ancestor to the 
royal lineage who was also credited with the invention of agriculture. The Shi jing clearly 
attempts to create a predynastic history for the Zhou, telling of the virtuous deeds of King 
Wen's father and grandfather, who were elevated by applying the title 'king' to them 
posthumously, and also of Houji. All of them are described as having a special relationship 
with heaven due to their virtuous actions, thus prefiguring the Mandate finally received by 
King Wen.104 This is no doubt a strategy of legitimizing the rule of the royal lineage, as we 
have seen that antiquity was consciously referenced by the reforms, and therefore probably 
carried effects in increased prestige. As all of the lineages traced their founding ancestors to 
the time of the conquest, creating a history for the kings pushing past that moment effectively 
ensured their seniority among the nobility and might have allowed them to stand ritually apart
due to their age.
regarded as a compilation of elite music from the Zhou metropolitan area.
101 Shi jing 266-296
102 Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC), 47.
103 Shi jing 275-279, 290-291
104 Ibid. 235-244, 275
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The ever increasing symbolification of violence in the reformed ancestral cult practices meant
that war and hunting, both of whom had been essential forms ritual behavior connected to the 
cult, were transformed and integrated into the new system in new guises. One of them was the
archery ritual (Dashe 大射), occasionally mentioned in the bronze inscriptions, that had 
obvious links to both hunting and war, as the bow was the primary weapon of the Zhou 
nobility, but from the inscriptions it is clear that the ritual was very formal, targets were 
inanimate, and it was linked to diplomacy and visits of major nobles. Not much else can be 
deduced from the inscriptions, but it is clear that the ritual elevated a practical combat skill 
into a realm of ritual and politics, and thus it can be surmised that the original purpose of 
killing targets was no longer relevant to elite life. A similar development can be seen in 
process on the institution of warfare in general. Hunts and raids were originally seen as 
recreations of the founding acts of violence performed by the founding ancestors, that were 
the source of the de of the lineage. There is evidence of a transformation of this practice in the
royal ancestral cult, where the conquest campaign of King Wu was adapted into a form of 
ritual dance that would be performed during sacrifices105 to establish the right to govern of the
dynasty, but again transposed onto a symbolic level.
The increasing elaborateness and complexity of rituals after the reforms must have changed 
the way they were organized as well. Coordinating music and dance performances by large 
ensembles and providing food for larger and larger numbers of guest required specialists at 
least controlling the ritual performances. It would seem also logical that considering the focus 
on immaculate performances, that the dancers and musicians might have been specially 
trained too, with the actual celebrants relegated to the audience with perhaps a stage visit here 
and there. The difference to the past is striking. Whereas before the point of the rituals had 
been to affirm the capability of the present members of the cult to prove that they could match
the deeds of the ancestors, now they were to preside over symbolic re-enactment of lineage 
history, thus affirming their descent from the giants of the past and the allegiances to their 
peers and superiors that they entailed, but without the experiential dimension of unity with the
living past, that had in effect been turned into history.
105
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4.3.3 The Spring and Autumn period
The inability of the ancestral cult system to regulate and distribute political power was 
apparent by the end of Western Zhou, as the monarchy was increasingly controlled by the 
regional rulers,106and similar developments were underway in many of their own states, where
major subject lineages were competing with each other and the rulers for control. This led to a
search for alternative ways of governing relations between lineages with the blood covenant 
(meng 盟) institution replacing traditional ritual ties first among the state rulers and filtering 
downward in society from there.107 The covenants comprised of two parts, a text stipulating 
the responsibilities of the participants and sanctions for breaking them, and a ceremony where
the text was probably read aloud in front of witnesses, who, in the most complete example of 
a preserved covenant, included “the spirits of the great mountains and rivers, the collected 
heavenly spirits and spirits who receive sacrifice, the former kings and former lords, and the 
ancestors of the seven surnames and twelve states”.108The spirits were summoned with the 
blood of a sacrificial animal, and the pledge substantiated with the drinking of its blood. Thus 
we can see that there were continuities with earlier ritual, but also significant differences.
The reliance on violence as a mean to attract the spirits is still evident in the practice, which 
corresponds to the earlier Western Zhou notion of sacrifice being equated with war. The point 
is further corroborated by the fact that during the ceremony the ear of the victim was cut off, 
just as slain enemies' ears were brought to the ancestral temple for reporting of successful 
battles.109The textual communication with spirits is also familiar from the bronze inscriptions. 
What is striking in the quotation above is the list of beings invoked. The participants in the 
covenant were lords of regional states that had vanquished the state of Zheng in 562 BCE, but
they confidently call on spirits that had been the exclusive ritual prerogative of the Zhou 
kings, including the royal ancestors and heaven. This suggests a collectivization of spiritual 
beings, who had been only available through familiar connections, or in the case of local 
spirits, the control of land inexorably linked to descent, but were now available to all to call 
on. Furthermore, they did no longer serve a positive role in conferring privilege and creating 
106 Chen and Pines, “Where Is King Ping? The History and Historiography of the Zhou Dynasty’s  
Eastward Relocation,” 13.
107 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 43–44.
108 Lewis, 47.
109 Lewis, 46.
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social order, but acted as enforcers of any order agreed upon by the participants in the 
covenant. Both of these characteristics can be seen as mirroring developments in the 
administrative structure of the states, where bureaucratization of government was in the 
process of sidelining hereditary officials on the other hand, and first written codes of law were
being promulgated, making the state take precedence over the lineages in the handling of 
disputes and misbehavior110.
A further interesting characteristic of the blood covenants is that they employ violence as a 
way of political legitimacy in the same way as the ancestral rituals predating the reforms 
described above. It is perhaps telling of the reforms' success that the conceptual changes 
inherent in them were largely ignored in the construction of new forms of political ritual. This
might point to the fact, that although the material changes were widely adopted, the intended 
effect of “taming” the warrior culture of the elites by increasing the symbolic distance 
between political power and violence was largely unsuccessful. So when the kings, and the 
ancestral cult along them, lost their status as the source of unity, the replacement relied on 
ritually confirming the primacy of military power as the producer of political control. 
Rhetorically however, most of the regional rulers still clung to the primacy of the kings and 
claimed to be protecting the monarchy through their actions, although they freely infringed on
royal privileges.
The way such ritual infractions were dealt with changed with the covenant institution. While 
the Zhou kings had responded to usurpation or insubordination with “pacifying” the 
offenders, which meant forcing them to uphold their ritual obligations, and thus repairing the 
break in the ritual order of the world, the punishment for breaking a covenant was far more 
severe. In the example of the list of enforcers quoted above, the texts states that if someone 
violates the mandate (ming ) stipulated in it the spirits will “destroy him so that his people 
desert him, he loses rank and clan, and his state and family are extinguished.”111 What for the 
earlier Zhou world had been a cataclysmic event associated with the loss of territory and 
cessation of the ancestral sacrifices of a state,112 the eradicating an entire lineage became a 
110 Hsu, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” 584–85.
111 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 48.
112 For contrast, King Wu installed relatives of the Shang kings to continue their sacrifices, even though they 
were construed as betraying the mandate of heaven. The removal of the corrupt members and loss of ritual 
primacy and acceptance of their now subordinate position was enough.
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standard tool for punishing political opponents or disloyal subjects in the machinations that 
increasingly occupied the elite during the Eastern Zhou.
The destruction of a lineage seldom meant the killing of all its members, usually only the 
leaders and immediate kin were slain and the land taken, with the lower ranking member 
possibly expulsed from the state. This led to increasing numbers of lower ranking elites 
without clear social status or means of subsistence, both of which had been provided by the 
lineage. This floating population was drawn upon by the factions still in competition with 
each other, and the covenant was increasingly used to form ties of political loyalty between 
individuals. This way what had been a substitute for the authority of the kings to facilitate 
cooperation between the regional rulers eventually became the institution to form political 
communities from individuals in general. Although these coalitions were based on the 
common will of the participants, they were not in any way democratic, as the covenants 
always had a host or a master, that is someone to whom loyalty was pledged, and thus formed 
hierarchic ties. This formed new structures of authority that bypassed lineage loyalties and the
ritually sanctioned relations between them. The legitimacy of the bond created by the 
covenant still relied on the sacrifice as an act of symbolic war, but the nourishing aspect that 
strengthened the reciprocal bond between the sacrificer and the spirits was entirely lacking 
and the ritual killing served only as a reminder of what would befall if either party would 
break the covenant.113
4.4 The Ritualism of Confucius
This is more or less the state of affairs around Confucius' lifetime (traditional dates 551-479 
BCE). Very little certain is known of his life, but it appears that he was born into an elite 
family, albeit one fairly low status. There are hints of him being forced to work for his living 
when young in the Lunyu itself, but he was also able to learn of the inherited literature from 
113 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 49–52.
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earlier Zhou times, which has led some to suggest that his occupation might have been a ritual
specialist engaged in staging the elaborate performances connected with the ancestral cult of 
the nobility.114Later on he served in minor government positions in his home state of Lu, while
also gathering students around him. Around 496 BCE Confucius left Lu, possibly due to 
moral disgust toward the usurpation of its rule by three ministerial lineages, who had exiled 
the legitimate ruler and installed a puppet in his stead. For the following decade or so 
Confucius toured the regional states with his students, seeking audiences with rulers, but 
without much success. After returning to Lu he might have received a middle-ranking post in 
the administration, but details on the matter are inconclusive. After his death his students 
continued to spread his teachings, but they held differing interpretations of them and divided 
into separate schools.115
Having now sketched the social milieu and its historical development and the life of 
Confucius, it is time to see what exactly was his response to the crisis that the Spring and 
Autumn period society was facing. It is clear that Confucius saw himself as a Zhou loyalist 
intent on restoring the authority of the dynasty, but in order to see how exactly this could have
been achieved we have to inspect how few key terms are treated in the Lunyu. These are li, 
ritual, ren, humanity and junzi, commonly translated as 'gentleman'. In addition to these, we 
will look into how he thought of certain related issues such as political authority and heredity.
4.4.1 The junzi
We shall start with the figure of junzi. The concept is central to Confucius’ project. It is the 
goal of his own studies and his education of others. Often translated as ‘noble man’, ‘superior 
man’ or something similar, the literal translation is ‘the son of a ruler’, that is an heir. I find 
this literal translation to be more useful for my interpretation than 'noble man' for two reasons.
First 'nobility' in the sense of 'belonging to the ruling class (by birth)' is obviously an 
impossible translation, since it is not possible to aspire to birthright. While it is possible to 
attain the position by ones own deeds also, there are multiple passages in the Lunyu 
114 Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven, 37.
115 Kallio, Mestari Kongin Keskustelut, 23–26.
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describing the junzi as indifferent to high station, so clearly this cannot be what Confucius 
means by it.116 The other option 'noble' as 'ethically excellent' is a possible option, and a 
popular one among translators, but it does not assist in interpretation, as it only begs the 
question 'What did Confucius consider as ethical?' to make any sense of it, therefore simply 
acting as a veil for the actual question. 
That the question is about heredity and power is then evident in Confucius' choice of term for 
his object that combines the concepts. While concrete inheritance of station would seem to 
make sense if we see Confucius as a traditionalist wishing to return to the old system of 
hereditary rule through the ancestral cults, but clearly this can’t be the case, as he is 
advocating the position of an heir for all of his students, even though many of them are from 
the lower classes of society and aspiring for a ruling position would mean usurpation of 
traditional privilege. Clearly something else is meant by him, and I believe the key to 
understanding where Confucius sees himself and his students inheriting his position from lies 
in two passages in the Lunyu, 7:23 and 9:5.
7:23  “The master said: The de in me has been birthed by heaven, 
what can Huan Tui117 do to me?  
子曰：天生德於予，桓魋其如予何？
9:5  “The Master was under threat in Kuang. He said: Even though 
King Wen is already gone, isn't his wen still here? If heaven would 
have wanted this wen to perish, us who are yet to die would have not 
been able to be uplifted by it. Since heaven has not yet allowed this 
wen to perish, what can the men of Kuang do to me?”
子畏於匡。曰:文王既沒，文不在茲乎？天之將喪斯文也，
後死者不得與於 斯文也；天之未喪斯文也，匡人其如予何
These passages show Confucius confronted with powerful opponents and in both cases he 
asserts his superiority by claiming he has something that has been passed on from a higher 
power, de engendered in him by heaven in the first case, the wen, of king Wen in the second. 
116 4:5, 4:11
117 Huan Tui was a minister of war (sima ) of the state of Song. Why he antagonized Confucius is not known.
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As the de of King Wen derives from heaven, his acts and therefore the wen left by them are 
also of heavenly origin. According to the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, the de of heaven 
should be the royal lineage’s prerogative, as it is the one selected by to rule the world and 
since de is inherited through the rituals of the ancestral cult as seen above, only the 
descendants of the royal line should have access to it, unless Heaven has shifted its mandate 
elsewhere. So there are two possibilities for Confucius to possess the de of Heaven: Heaven 
has retired the Mandate from the royal line and granted it to Confucius. We would expect him 
to mention this more often if he believed it to be so, so we can state this as an unlikely 
interpretation. The other option would be that Confucius sees himself as a descendant of King 
Wen, that is, his heir.
It is clear that a literal interpretation of Confucius’ conception of his heredity is impossible, 
but what does it then mean? The other passage quoted above provides the answer. In it he 
states that even though king Wen, the originator of the Zhou house is no longer, something of 
him still remains, his wen. preserved by Heaven for the benefit of those who have come after 
him. Wen are patterns, here best understood as the traces left of the deeds of an ancestor still 
visible in the present. In the Lunyu they are mostly an object of study, something that is 
required to become an heir, and perhaps crucially, in 3:14, it is the excellence of the Zhou 
dynasty’s wen that causes Confucius to follow it’s lead. Later wen came to mean texts, and by 
extension culture and the civil side of the civilian/military distinction. So Confucius seems to 
trace his ancestry to King Wen through study of his heritage still present in the cultural fabric 
of his times through immersing himself in and putting into practice the cultural and social 
institutions that are the product of the work of King Wen in establishing the base of Zhou 
society.
Thus for Confucius the focus of the ancestral cult is no longer the sacrifice that facilitates the 
flow from past to present and vice versa, not even symbolically. He seems to agree to the 
developments in political relations that deepened the gulf between ruler and subject to the 
extent that the former needed nothing but respect and obedience from the latter. King Wen has
put his institutions in place and Confucius' responsibility is that his orders, ming, or mandate 
is carried out and on. On the other hand, the decision is Confucius' to make, if he wants, he 
can become the heir of the dynasty through conscious effort of emulating King Wen. Thus the 
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ancestral system becomes a meritocracy, as knowledge of and skill in performance of the 
dynasty's cultural heritage becomes the defining condition of the crown prince instead of 
conventional inheritance.
The junzi was then a heir to the Zhou power, but reinterpreted to fit the new situation. The 
lineages were gone or on their way out of the political arena, as was the ancestral cult and 
they had shown that sacrifice and family solidarity could not preserve the de of the exemplars 
of yore and keep the civilized world united. The insight on which Confucius based his 
teaching was that the rituals that bound the Zhou world together were not really the grand 
displays and hunts of the ancestral cult, but the social rubric, the dress, manners, the relations 
between people were the true legacy of the kings. They defined a new community that 
transcended clan loyalties and were available to all, if only people would see them. This 
explains the stress on immanence of virtue in the early parts of the Lunyu where “If I want 
virtue, it is here.”118 
4.4.2 The Social Position of the Confucians
How then did Confucius convert this insight into a social and educational program? It has 
generally been thought that it consisted of training young men in the art of virtuous 
government, in order to change society from the inside, as they would influence the leaders of
their states, who would then adopt policies espoused by him.119Eno takes a critical look at this 
view at this, and finds little evidence of Confucians serving in government, or participating in 
famous policy debates recorded in historical sources. This compounded with the fact that 
Confucius himself rejects all offers of administrative posts made to him in the Lunyu, 
counsels several of his disciples not to accept positions offered to them, as well as is evasive 
or dismissive about enquiries made by those in power about the suitability of his students 
leads Eno to presume that the view of Confucians as dutiful public servants is a projection of 
an image corresponding for one part to the attitudes of the school in later imperial epochs, but 
also one that the Early Confucians themselves cultivated to legitimize their ideological 
118 Lunyu 7:30
119 Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven, 42.
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program.120
As already mentioned, Eno sees the Confucians operating with what he calls a 'bifurcated 
doctrine', meaning that they effectively had two different bodies of knowledge aimed at 
different audiences: an external one composed of texts, such as the Lunyu. The internal 
doctrine, in contrary, was the program of ritual education aiming for the construction of 
ethically superior humans that was built of bodily practices and attitudes and could not be 
learned from writing or speech, but from emulation and participation. The internal program 
could thus only be appreciated and understood by someone who was already immersed in it, 
so the external linguistic doctrine had to exist in order to persuade outsiders to try the 
program, or at least explain its usefulness to them.121This is where the duty of governing 
comes into play. It provides an argument for the Confucian education in two levels, as it 
addresses the applicability of its contents for everyday life for the outsiders, while allowing 
the insiders a position that's above others engaged in the pursuit of good government.
The basic Confucian tenet is that ethical excellence translates into excellence in government.  
Thus persons with a Confucian training are superior to everyone else as they understand what 
truly constitutes good government, and they have a duty to participate in it in order to better 
the life of others and bring back the golden age of the Early Zhou. Why then we see so few 
Confucians in positions of power? An answers seems to be provided by the Lunyu, where 
Confucius is three times approached by a powerful figure in order to solicit his aid in the 
political arena, however Confucius turns down all three offers due to the same reason, the 
unworthiness of the potential patron. Thus while the Confucians state having a duty to 
participate in public affairs, it seems that the internal goal of ethical cultivation overrides this 
external one, as a subordinate position in an uncouth administration subjects one to risks to 
one's moral purity and is thus not desirable.122 Further evidence for this position in the Lunyu 
comes from 4:5 and 6:9 where Confucius advises his disciples to quit states with bad leaders 
and 5:8 that seems to downplay the importance of ren in government, but as stated by Jyrki 
Kallio, this might be a snub towards Meng Wu,the person asking the questions from 
Confucius, who had participated in the usurpation of the state of Lu from its rightful rulers, in 
120 Eno, 43–45.
121 Eno, 43–45.
122 Eno, 44.
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effect “Ethical excellence has nothing to do with your government.”123。
Thus while claiming to train for the political arena, the Early Confucians were markedly 
reticent about entering it in practice due to their sense of superiority towards its other 
participants. A similar tendency of establishing value systems competing with the ones of the 
old land-based Zhou nobility and the rising bureaucratic administrators has been noted by 
Lewis in all the early intellectual schools of the Springs and Autumns and Warring States 
eras.124The Confucians, Mohists and Yangists all existed in varying degrees of opposition to 
the establishment. In the Confucian case the present political situation was seen as too 
corrupt, and supporters focused on self-improvement while waiting for the times to change. 
This creates an interesting parallel with what Poo Mu-Chou has called 'self-divinization 
movements' of the Warring States. He states that there was an increasingly strong focus in 
Warring States thought for processes of self-transformation with the aim to surpass the limits 
of human senses and intelligence and achieve an all-encompassing perspective that would 
enable the individual superhuman powers. Traditionally the Neiye-chapter of the Guanzi has 
been considered the earliest example of this mode of thought, and its development has been 
traced through the thinkers affiliated with the Daoist school, although there are elements of 
the omnipotent sage -character in the Mengzi too. Looking at Early Confucianism through 
Eno's lens of ethical self-improvement societies allows for aligning it in the general 
intellectual milieu where development of personal abilities through integrating the self into 
some greater whole seems to have been a central concern, although the cosmic context seen in
later thought seems to be lacking and the world for the Early Confucians is decidedly human 
and social. Only in later Confucian writings, such as the Mengzi and Xunzi is the superhuman 
dimension of the sage developed.
4.4.3 Confucius' Insight on the Function of Rituals
This view of Confucius also allows for a new perspective on his thoughts on ritual. Later 
Confucians have seen ritual as an instrument of social control, or social cohesion, depending 
123 Kallio, Mestari Kongin Keskustelut. footnote to 5:8, 161
124 Lewis, Writing and Authority in Early China, 63–64.
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on the viewpoint taken, but in the Lunyu ritual seems to be something that defines boundaries 
and while it is instrumental both in governing a state, but perhaps more crucially, governing 
the self. This is in keeping with the self-improvement agenda of the Confucians. In 4:13 
Confucius says that success requires yielding for the (benefit of the) state according to ritual, 
which I interpret as using ritual as a guide to where personal gain must succumb to the public.
4:13 “The Master said: Where are those who know to employ the li 
and thus place the (interests of the) state above (the interests of) their 
own selves? And those who do not, they are not worth mentioning in 
comparison.”
子曰：能以禮讓為國乎？何有？不能以禮讓為國，如禮何？
 So the boundary between a ruler and a state, or indeed a subject and a state is drawn by ritual,
and those unable to do so properly, are not really capable of any government, showing the 
Confucians' superior attitude towards administrators, or self-aggrandizing rulers, who can do 
no good to a state. 6:27 ritual is used to define the relation between a junzi and his studies, so 
that he would not err regardless of the breadth of things he studies. This suggests again that 
ritual is used to divide the permissible and unpermissible and thus define what the junzi can 
be. 
6:27 The Master said: “If a junzi comprehensively studies wen and 
bind himself with li, then there is sure to be no betrayal on his part.”
子曰：君子博學於文，約之以禮，亦可以弗畔矣夫！ 
The word 'bind' (yue 約) occurring in twice above is interesting as it was a term used for 
written contracts that during the times of Confucius were increasingly supplanting ritual ties 
in defining the political loyalties of individuals.125 This meant that inherited positions lost their
importance, as it was possible to choose the person one wished to follow by binding oneself to
them via a contract. Another novel feature was that the power of the bond laid in its textual 
nature, it was essentially a covenant, but without the sacrifice. Rights and responsibilities 
were set down in writing and archived, the administrative power of documents conquering 
125 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 67–69.
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over the ritual bonds created by sacrifice reflecting the loosening of the traditional ritual ties 
and the bureaucratization and professionalization of the political sphere of late Spring and 
Autumn era. It is curious then that Confucius would use such a word, as his program seems to
run counter to the very development the bonds exemplified, unless we take him as trying to 
contest its meaning. The textuality of bonds would have surely drawn criticism from the Early
Confucians, as there is a strong opposition to words and talking in the Lunyu.126 It is repeated 
that a junzi is careful in his speech and prefers action to demonstrate his capabilities, and also 
appraises others by observing their conduct rather than listening them speak. This can be read 
as a critique of persons  declaring undying loyalty and devotion to a political master in bonds, 
only to break them when the push comes to the shove. True loyalty was to be demonstrated in 
action, and for the Confucians it was ritual action that ultimately would prove their loyalty.
In 9:3 Confucius considers two ways where his contemporaries went against traditional 
norms. First is that linen is proscribed as the proper material for hats, but silk was currently 
preferred. Confucius sees no problem with it, since using silk is frugal. On the other hand, 
people had also been taken to make their bows of respect after climbing the steps outside of a 
building, alhtough the rituals stipulate bowing below the steps. This is seen as a breach of 
conduct by Confucius, as he considers it arrogant. Thus it would seem that the rituals are not 
eternal and can be revised to fit the age as long as it is done in harmony with their spirit. Since
silk has become cheaper than linen due to advances in production, it is not improper to change
a rule to reflect the new situation. Arrogance, however, is not a valid reason for change, as 
curbing excessive egoism seems to be one of the primary functions of the rituals.
9:3 The Master said: “The li stipulates a hempen hat, but nowadays 
silk is used. This is economical, and thus I follow others in doing so. 
The li stipulates that one must bow before ascending the steps to a 
hall, but nowadays people bow at the top. This is extravagant, and thus
I ignore others and bow at the bottom.”
子曰：麻冕，禮也；今也純，儉。吾從眾。拜下，禮也；今
拜乎上，泰也。雖違眾，吾從下。
As Confucius stresses elsewhere, it is not enough to know the li but be able to put it in 
126 4:24, 5:5, 
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practice. The above example would seem to imply that it meant somehow obtaining their 
spirit, so one could adapt them to current situations, instead of being stuck with the antiquated
rules. Perhaps it was by exposure and experience that one developed this ritual instinct.
As we can see from the preceding paragraph, the Lunyu does not contradict the tendency for 
personal choice overriding tradition, in either it's external doctrine, which recommends 
finding administrative work, or the internal one, which requires adherents to place the 
Confucian community and its ritual purity over any political ties as the ultimate object of 
loyalty. And this seems to be what was meant by tying with ritual. The leaders that truly 
deserved loyalty were the former kings, but the traditional ritual ties connected to the 
ancestral cults were not valid anymore as the later descendants of the kings and regional rulers
of old had squandered their inheritance and were seen as only paying lip service to their 
ancestors, not having their heart in it, and thus not really understanding what it was about. 
Thus new ones had to be forged, and the Confucians took to the task by personal devotion to 
the system created by the former kings. Although it was no longer functioning, all the pieces 
existed and study of ritual, music and culture could uncover them and by putting them in 
practice allow persons to shape themselves in the image of the ancients, becoming their true 
inheritors.
Thus the Confucians ran counter to the tendency to attach loyalty to certain persons instead of
lineage groups evident in the development of the bond institution, as their commitment was to
the entire Zhou cultural system, but in other respects followed its general outline summed up 
by Lewis: 
“This new focus suggested the fundamental importance of the intent 
or will of the participants, the compelling and unequal character of the
relationship, and the strong element of devotion implicit in the act. In 
contrast to the centrality of the sacrifice and the spirits in the covenant,
the bond decentered the actual act of taking a life and emphasized the 
moral and emotional basis of human ties, as well as their hierarchic 
and authoritarian character.”127
That violence and killing were in the center of the Zhou ancestral cults we have already seen, 
127 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 78.
50
but for all their talk of reviving traditions, the Confucians were actually in step with their 
times to reduce the importance of the actual sacrifice, while they concentrated on the attitude 
and comportment of the sacrificer as the true focus, as the object of sacrifice, as well as all the
other rituals, was actually the transformation of the self. This set the sacrificial rituals that had
dominated the religious and political life of the earlier Zhou dynasty on an equal footing with 
other more everyday aspects of ritual. This is in evidence in Lunyu 9:13 cited above, which is 
the only time Confucius discusses concrete ritual performances in the books oldest layer. The 
examples are of mundane behavior, not of grand state ritual. This is telling of the attitude of 
Early Confucianism towards ritual. The whole fabric of society was ultimately woven of the 
sageness of the former kings, and so commanded equal respect, and had equal potential for 
self-improvement. This is evidenced by the well-known Lunyu 7:22, where Confucius states 
that at least every other person has something worth emulating in them, and several passages 
describing the immanence of virtue128. 
4.4.4 Opposition to Violence and Vengeance
The repudiation of violence, and especially of vengeance, is also well-attested in the Lunyu. 
One of the hallmarks of the junzi is his patience in the face of insults. In two occasions129 
Confucius describes the the two ideals of the past Bo Yi 伯夷 and Shu Qi 叔齊 not hating 
others due to not dwelling in past injustices and his favorite disciple Yan Hui 顏回 gets the 
same honor in 6:3. This can be understood through the warrior culture of the Zhou that had 
contributed to the downfall of the lineage system. Personal honor was paramount to the Zhou 
nobility and any infractions against it were swiftly punished, as aptly described by the story of
a retainer punching the face of his ruler after he had questioned his subjects loyalty during a 
social game in the king's private quarters.130 The relative equality of the Western Zhou elites 
made no-one above possible retribution. This was compounded by the imperative to be 
remembered that provided a firm reason to aspire for greatness and to protect the fame of any 
achievements. When rulers started to get elevated to their own social class during the late 
Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the imperative for vengeance shifted too. 
128 4:6, 7:30
129 5:23 and 7:15
130 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 33.
51
Now it was the duty of the loyal retainer who had bonded himself to the lord to avenge for the
lord in addition to his personal honor. This created a network of revenge that constantly 
provoked violence between states as well as individuals. It has been estimated that in most of 
the interstate wars during the period the cause was either avenging an insult or making one.131 
The Confucian response to this culture of violence was twofold. First of all, they elevated the 
dynasty and its culture to the position of highest loyalty. Any vengeance was proper only if it 
furthered the restoration and expansion of the Zhou cultural system. This is why personal 
insults were not grounds for retribution. This would have been a meager consolation for the 
individuals suffering abuse, but the community provided for a more satisfying response too. 
As the Confucians believed in the superiority of their own value system, they could brush off 
anyone insulting them as simply being so far below them as not to be worth of notice.
Another way the Confucians attempted to deal with the culture of violence was the subjection 
of personal fame to the greater system. Confucius states in the Lunyu that he is not a creator, 
but a transmitter.132 The greatest achievement is to find the thread leading back to the founder 
kings in the culture that they left. Perhaps mirroring the social development that saw leaders 
rise far above others, the Confucians denied the possibility of equaling the deeds of the 
founders, at least for the vast majority of people, and elevated them to mythical proportions. 
As their doctrine derived from roots as noble as this, it made them clearly superior to any 
other source of authority and enabled them to distance themselves from the day to day 
political struggle, all the while claiming to hold the keys to ending it and recreating the 
supposedly harmonious society of the early Zhou. This approach was later replicated by other 
intellectual schools, who claimed an ancient worthy as the originator of their doctrine, Yao by 
the Mohists, The Yellow Emperor by the Agriculturalists, Laozi, the supposed teacher of 
Confucius by certain Daoist elements, and so on. Later the Duke of Zhou was seen as the 
originator of Confucian doctrine, perhaps due to his association with Lu, Confucius' home 
state. 
There is some evidence however, that he was specially revered by Confucius himself already, 
as in Lunyu 7:5 Confucius worries that it has been some time since he last saw the duke in his 
131 Lewis, 37.
132 7:1
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dreams. It is noteworthy that ancestors were considered to send dreams to their descendants, 
and this might hint that Confucius considered himself as a scion of the house of the Duke of 
Zhou, although the link is tenuous, it would fit well with the view of the Early Confucian 
approach to the ancestral cult that I present elsewhere in this study. Another possible 
connection between the duke and Confucianism in the ideological level would be that in the 
political debate on the inheritance of kingship at the time of King Cheng's regency between 
the dukes Zhou and Shao recorded in the Shangshu, duke Zhou promotes the idea that the 
mandate of heaven has been received by the Zhou as a group, and not the royal line 
personally, therefore rulership does not need to be transferred linearly, but should be given to 
those who have demonstrated their capabilities. Duke Shao insists that heaven has adopted the
king as its eldest son, therefore receiving the world as his inheritance, and no-one else can be 
substituted. Predictably, king Cheng sided with duke Shao, and duke Zhou retired from 
government.133 The issue would have certainly been known to Confucius, as the Shangshu 
was a part of his curriculum, and as such he might have identified with the figure of the duke 
Zhou, who was also credited with adapting the Shang ritual system in the beginning of the 
dynasty to fit the new rule, seeing himself as a continuator of his work in the new situation the
world had found itself.
4.4.5 The Human as a Socialized Body
The function of ritual in the Lunyu does not differ from what was the social function of the 
ancestral cult during earlier Zhou times, that is limiting aggression. While the ancestral cult 
had done this by drawing a line around the Zhou world and separated the killable and edible 
from fellow humans, due in part its focus in conquest and heroic deeds that encouraged 
seeking and protecting personal fame, had not been able to keep that line distinct enough to 
prevent interlineage violence within the Zhou world. The Early Confucians' answer was to 
reorient the Zhou world to become self-aware of the ritual system and how it was meant to 
work. 
Ritual excellence shifted from honoring the altars and ancestors with a steady supply of 
133 Shaughnessy, “Western Zhou History,” 24–25.
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victims and conquests to performance of ritual itself as a way of harmonizing ones own 
existence with the larger group that shared the same cultural heritage. The ritual boundary still
separated the human from inhuman, but was moved from around the society to within each of 
its members, separating the social humanity from asocial animality. This self-consciousness of
rituals' significance to society was one of the key discoveries of Confucius. Ritual bound not 
only descendants and ancestors to the land they drew sustenance from, but also every member
of society was dependent on shared forms of conduct, dress and ideas for the very possibility 
of the existence of society. And these were also passed on from generation to generation, up to
the same source as the Zhou nobility's land had come, the founding kings, and ultimately 
heaven itself.
So, society itself was sacred to the Early Confucians, as evidenced by the discussion on the 
proper material for a cap cited above. This turned everyday social interactions into ritual 
celebrations of the humanity of the participants. As the whole system was derived from 
heaven, no gradations within were possible, even the most mundane of social facts contained 
the whole in itself, and was a manifestation of the will to coexist, and proper performance 
evoked acceptance of it in its entirety, and vice versa. As these social institutions had been 
designed by persons much greater in merit than anyone living, they could not properly be 
understood discursively, therefore only experience and practice in their performance could 
propel one ahead on the way, as knowing the rituals did not entail virtuous conduct134.
This ritualization of everyday life was necessary for drawing attention to those things that 
made society possible. These changes to the practice of and attitudes towards ritual proposed 
by the Confucians revolved around reducing the importance of the lineage, which mirrors the 
general socio-political changes in motion at the time. Contrary to them, however, the 
Confucians wanted to also limit the influence of the state by relating people directly to the 
larger Zhou community that was symbolically represented by the monarchy, although the 
actual political power of the kings was not necessary for the functioning of the system, as it 
was due to the individual subjects to recognize and respect the ritual structure established by 
the virtue of the royal line that tied them together and act accordingly. This bypassed the 
growing influence of the state rulers, whose mutual competition was one of the major factors 
134 7:33
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affecting the instability of the Zhou world.
The way ritual worked was through shaping bodies. Acting ritually highlighted the underlying
common substrate of humanity. In offering a bow in greeting to someone, one acknowledges 
the similarity between the other and one self, in that the gesture only receives its meaning if it 
is replied to in like manner. In this way the bower recognizes the humanity of the other and 
his own humanity is thus confirmed in the ritually correct reply. All this is communicated in 
action, which is why comportment receives so much attention in the Lunyu. As Bell states, 
ritualization conjures the entire system of social relations in any one of its instances.135 Thus 
the one who instigates the ritual greeting displays deference, which implies the unfavorable 
opposite of pride. The response invokes propriety shadowed by uncivility. And around these, 
the meaning starts to get deferred to linked concepts of humanity/animality, 
civilization/barbarism, order/disorder, virtue/vice, and so forth, until the participants of this 
most minuscule of ritual exchanges have actually reconstituted their very identities and the 
social system they form the part of, as well as their bodies as ritualized agents capable of 
leveraging this system in order to make their actions in it personally fulfilling.
Since the ritualizing depends on others recognizing it as such, the Confucians were 
preoccupied with the correct performance. The Lunyu contains detailed descriptions of 
Confucius' clothing, facial expression, way of walking, etc. in certain situations. I see this as a
product of the Confucian view of ritual correctness being a requisite for successful action as 
described above. As others had no access to the mind of the performer, the sensual cues had to
be accurate enough to trigger the correct response from the common ritual substrate. This also
led to the view presented in some passages that ren was contagious.136 In treating others in 
ritually correct ways, a person awakes parts of their shared cultural heritage and their 
responses reconstitute their bodies in a manner able to leverage that heritage themselves thus 
spreading correct action to their surroundings. Later Confucianism elevated this mechanism to
the primary function of government in the metaphor of the wind of the junzi bowing the grass 
of the people, regardless of their dispositions. This visual dimension of mutually affirmed 
humanity is the key to the concept of ren.
135 Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, 130.
136 4:1, 4:7
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In the Western Zhou ren refered to manliness, masculinity and the handsomeness 
exemplifying the former qualities. It shares ancestry with shi, that was originally used to 
differentiate male animals from females in the Shang script.137 Shi eventually became the self-
reference of the Zhou nobility, possibly due to its association with the ideal of the warrior 
associated with masculinity, and the patrilinear kin ties uniting them through the ancestral 
cult.138 By the time of Mencius it had turned into a technical term in Confucianism describing 
the humane-ness inculcated through the love of family members. As the Lunyu stands in the 
middle of this transition and abounds with references to ren, we should be able to find clues to
what caused the word to undergo this change in meaning during the Spring and Autumn 
period.
For Confucius ren is intimately linked to the junzi. This draws the etymological connection to 
masculinity, as an ideal heir of earlier times would have indeed been a masculine and martial 
warrior able to carry on the legacy of his forbears. As discussed above, it was believed that the
de as capacity to subjugate others was believed to radiate out of those who possessed it, and 
thus the suitability of a nobleman to this task would be evident from his power to draw in the 
outside, by force of arms or charisma. But as Confucius changed the rules of heredity, the 
aspect of the ideal heir changed accordingly. Now he was able to rise others to their own true 
heritage by engaging in ritually proper behavior and harness the de of the former kings to 
affirm his own humanity by invoking others'. The focus here is still on the visual, as it is in 
action that the junzi reveals himself, and as a consequence his ren is spread around his social 
surroundings. Thus the community of ren comes to replacethe patrilinear shi as the principle 
of social ordering, leaving the particularities of the lineages for a more general shared identity
as inheritors to to the Zhou tradition and the humanity generated by it. This ren is still public 
and present in action, in contrast to the meaning it acquired in Mencius' project of providing a 
psychological motivation for adopting the Confucian ritual program, which reoriented it from 
the public sphere into the privacy of the family unit recently created by the administrative 
reforms.
The focus on individual performance and adoption of the li meant a new personalization of 
ritual. As we have seen the Western Zhou Ritual Reform affected a change in the ancestral 
137 Kallio, Mestari Kongin Keskustelut, 37.
138 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, 32–33.
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cults rituals, where the primary audience changed from the ancestors to other nobility and 
possibly commoners. The performance was staged by professional dancers, musicians and 
other ritualists, and its purpose was to display the power and rank of the lineage to outsiders, 
while the rituals before had been of a group celebrating its own history and future. 
Confucianism wanted to revert back to the old, as it saw personally and consciously 
performing the rituals as the key to self-improvement. It is not possible to know if this return 
to the past was done in purpose, that is if Confucius knew of the pre-Reform rituals, or is this 
merely a coincidence. The changes also challenged the opulence of the rituals, whose function
had become to impress. The Lunyu advises thrift in performances and focuses rather on the 
sincerity and appropriateness of the performers, again stressing the personal over the 
spectacle.
4.4.6 A Preliminary Conclusion and a Note on Theory
And to close off this section of the work I would like continue in the vein of the above 
paragraph in commenting on the level of consciousness in Confucius' proposed program. Bell 
states that ritual action is always blind to its true purposes. She quotes Michel Foucault saying
that “people know what they do and they know why they do what they do, but they do not 
know what what they are doing does.”139 Now, this contradicts to an extent my analysis of 
Confucius, as I see just this realization of the social function of ritual as the center, the one 
thread, if you will, of his program. There seems to be a blind spot in Bell's view, that excludes
the possibility of ritual practitioners metatheorizing their own practice, although she does 
write about the scientific theorizing of ritual and how it has constructed the object of its 
scrutiny, deconstruction of which is a major aim of the book (Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice). 
As well as being anti-theoretical, as in refusing to construct a coherent theory of what 'ritual' 
is, the reason for this lacuna might lie in the theorists that Bell mostly reads to formulate her 
practice-centered outlook, namely Luis Althusser, Pierre Bourdieu and Foucault. All known 
for focusing on power not as coercion directed by someone on the outside, but as constitutive 
of social reality or individual subjectivity itself, therefore functioning by defining the horizon 
of possible actions, instead of forcing it's subjects to choose in a certain manner.
139 Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, 108.
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While these analyses have provoked much thought and valuable research, they can also be 
criticized for certain element of inescapability. Once the hegemony is in place, or a subject 
formed its habitus, or has been formed by biopower, even with the knowledge of their 
functioning, it is not possible to step outside of them, as they are still constitutive of actors. 
Ritual reforms should therefore attach to reversals or changes in their signifying practices that
can be accepted by the potential ritual community. The symbolic reversal of the status of the 
pope in the Reformation as an example: a catholic would have mapped the pope/lay member 
pair to holy/sinful, but the economical practices of the church had destabilized this to the 
point that the reformers could reverse the mapping by claiming a moral bankruptcy of the 
church and holiness in the direct connection to God afforded by belief.
In this case the change in ritual followed a change in the social world that was caused by non-
ritual reasons, but what of reforming ritual traditions from the inside, without claimed 
rupture?  Bell does treat this, and comments that any tradition is always recreated in any 
appeal to it,140 but innovation is obviously limited by the acceptance of the ritual community 
intended for adoption of the practice. Perhaps we can see now see how Confucius' insight into
the Zhou ritual system's functioning might seen in the light of Bell's views. It is obvious that 
Confucius did not want to present himself as an innovator, as he explicitly states, but rather 
sought acceptance to his claim that he was returning to the authentic tradition of the Zhou 
kings. By doing so he sought acceptance to his new views, although from the treatment he 
received in the various courts it would seem that he was largely ignored outside the circle of 
his students. It also seems that Confucius did not include the new view on ritual I ascribe to 
him into his explicit teaching, which might have caused the frustration so evident among his 
students in the Lunyu. Several passages have Confucius professing the simplicity and 
immanence of his way,141 and conversely we see the students lamenting the difficulty and 
haziness in the very same teaching142.
Could this gap be caused by Confucius' metaperspective on ritual that he did not share with 
his students? From 7:24 and the passages cited above I get the feeling that the students felt 
that Confucius was holding some key ideas back, that would have enabled them to rise to his 
140 Bell, 130.
141 4:6, 6:17, 7:2, 7:30
142 6:12, 9:11
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level. It is of course also possible that this reticence was due to inarticulateness of his 
doctrine, as he predated the other schools who would soon start to question the principles and 
solutions of his students. Could it be that Confucius was simply using the ritual tools available
to him to try to make people respect the kings again, “not knowing what what he was doing 
did?” I do doubt it, simply for the reason that he was not very successful. There must have 
been hundreds of people like him trying to restore society and failing, but for some reason 
only Confucius' tradition survived. I believe this must be due to some novelty that caused 
people to flock around it see it as worthy of dedicating their lives to passing it on. It was 
obvious that there was something to it, just what it was wasn't so clear.
So  to return to the possibility that Confucius had a theory of ritual that although not as 
developed as the one employed in this study, still pointed into the same direction, that of ritual
construction of socialized agents and a reality infused with those social categories, and that 
this informed his renovation of the Zhou ritual practice, I deem it tenable. But it is also clear 
that the explicit formulation of this theory had to wait for future generations of his students, 
with two different versions passed on to us in the Mencius and Xunzi. Thus Confucius used 
his insight to sharpen his sense of ritual in an attempt to steer his contemporaries from the 
inside of the ritual tradition they ascribed to, although increasingly in name only.
5 Conclusion
So we have arrived to the end of our journey through the Zhou dynasty, or at least parts of its 
ritual system. There are few threads that I would like to pick up and provisorily explore where
they might lead from this work. The first one is the one that originally led me to start writing 
this thesis. It starts from a course essay I wrote for a seminar on Li Zehou's Lunyu jin du 論語
59
今讀 taught by monsieur Frédéric Wang in the INALCO in 2013, where I explored the way li,
ren and xiao 孝, filiality, could be linked together using Li's notion of sedimentation as the 
humanization of the world and of humans themselves. This led me to explore the relation 
between animality and humanity in Early China, which again led to the current work.
While there is very little direct discourse on the nature and status of animals during Western 
and early Eastern Zhou times, it practically explodes once the interschool debates commence 
in the fourth century BCE. Thus in order to make sense of the debate, it seemed reasonable to 
chart what had been thought of the matter before, what were the common presuppositions 
shared, or attacked, by the parties of the debate. This led me to Confucius, as criticism of 
Confucianism is the force driving the first outright argumentative works in the Chinese 
tradition, of which the Mozi 墨子 is the longest preserved one. The Lunyu speaks very little of 
animals, but as usually animals cannot be discussed without humans being implied and vice 
versa, so I decide to embark on a study of humanity in the Lunyu and to chart the evolution of 
the concept through earlier times.
As we have seen, in the beginning of the Zhou a human was a man, who had derived his 
humanity from heaven. To hold on to this gift, he had to perform as his primary duty the  
killing of non-humans in order to show himself worthy of humanity and to reforge the link to 
heaven through consuming the meat of his catch with his ancestors. This also formed the basis
of stable society, as social positions were defined by the ancestors and reconfirmed by 
circulating the sacrificial meat through dependent and superior lineages affirming social ties. 
The king was at the top of the hierarchy as the original recipient of heavenly favor. This 
presents an interesting possibility of further study brushed upon in this thesis. As the king was
the ultimate source of authority he was also the ultimate threat, the one whose potential for 
violence was the greatest. This creates an interesting parallel to western ideas of sovereignty, 
particularly that of Hobbes, who saw in it the end of the state of nature, where all were 
constantly under threat of violence, until the social contract delegated the monopoly of its 
conductance to the sovereign, who then became the sole just killer making civilized society 
and humanity possible.
The parallel to Western Zhou kingship is striking, but the matter is made even more 
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interesting by introducing Jacques Derrida's notion of sovereignty as the self-defining feature 
distinguishing humans from animals, and eating as a fundamental way of relating oneself to 
the world. The sovereign has the right to rule, and thus freedom from the bestial instincts. To 
crown this all there is the Zhou kings' self reference yiren 一人, one human, often written with
the definitive article as the One Man. Now reminding ourselves that one in Chinese 
connotates wholeness and completeness, the king becomes the one true man, the sovereign, 
the originator of violence and the bulwark of civilization in a soup of related concepts so thick
that I find it difficult to resist probing it right away.
But in the interest of finishing this thesis I will continue with it for a while longer. During the 
Zhou rule many of the surrounding peoples and polities were drawn to the might and prestige 
of it and started to adopt certain features of its elite culture in a development that would 
continue to the fifth century BCE, when the cultural border around what was to become China
started to harden. This Zhouisation was a contributor to the decline of the ancestral cults as it 
brought in new members to the state structure that had not been participants to its founding, 
and thus had no place in the original hierarchy of the cults. It also increased the diversity 
within the Zhou world, which was already growing apart into several regionalized variants of 
the culture. There was an attempt to stop this process around the middle of the ninth century 
BCE, when comprehensive reforms to the Zhou rituals were promulgated by the king, which 
attempted to bring the royal house back into the ideological center of the Zhou world by 
fostering a culture of remembrance and nostalgia for the founding kings of the dynasty and 
their victories. This attempt at creation of a new common identity for the estranged parts of 
the Zhou realm ultimately failed, but its key building blocks of symbolification of violence 
inherent in the traditional ancestral cult practices, focus on solemnity and correct performance
of rituals and reverent attitude towards the first kings elevated to legendary status were to 
inspire Confucius in his own program of reform.
The concept of humanity that arose from Confucius's interpretation of the Zhou rituals had 
parallels to that of early Western Zhou already discussed, but the major difference was the 
substitution of cultural excellence to capacity for violence. The origin myth of the dynasty 
was changed from the conquest campaign against Shang into the creation of its social and 
ritual institutions that were the basis of humanity. The access to this civilizing power 
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originating in heaven was freed from the confines of patrilinear descent regulated by the 
ancestral cults to the cultural realm, where it was free for anyone to employ. Thus the descent 
group of the kings broadened to the entire Zhou world, potentially including anyone adopting 
the correct ritual forms of behavior. This meant that while humanity was still derived from 
heaven, it was no longer dependent on domination of the non-human, but interaction with 
other humans, which would allow reciprocal affirmation of the humanity of the participants, 
that was elevated by Confucius in making it ritualized thus setting it on a status parallel to the 
great services of the state cults. Humanity still had to triumph over animality, but the 
battleground was internal and success depended on others as well as oneself.
This is then the conclusion of my study, and as I anticipated, it leads to interesting ways of 
apprehending some aspect of the philosophical debates that were to follow over the coming 
three centuries or so. First of all, when later Confucians, Mohists, Daoists and others debate 
the correct role and composition of the state, they are actually arguing about what it is to be a 
human. The Confucian conservatism arises from their conception of humanity as something 
fragile, only enabled by the civilizing influence of society. This view is exemplified by Xunzi 
荀子 in his famous thesis of the “badness” of human nature, which can be lifted to morality 
only by artifice. Humanity is a construct that confines the asocial animal within us all and 
enables cooperation. Similar notions are furthered by Mencius, although he claims that the 
moral system is inborn, but requires careful nurturing to grow straight. Humans themselves 
are not able humanize themselves, only a superhuman sage can understand society and plan 
reforms.
The Daoists on the contrary see humans as animals no different from the others. One of the 
human-animals' traits is sociability, they tend to enjoy each others' company and work and 
live together in groups, just like many other animals do. The kind of artifice caused by 
Confucian or other kind of training is seen to cause more harm than good, as the complex 
stratified society it enables only serves to subjugate human-animals to the will of others 
causing them to abandon their natural sociability and start murdering each other for 
insignificant causes like property, power or honor, that are all creations of the same system 
that purports to make them into something more noble.
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These two interpretations are of course but impressionist sketches of the possibilities of taking
'humanity' as one of the  central terms in the Warring States period philosophy that fiercely 
debated the nature of rulership, society and humanity, eventually developing the ideology that 
was to enable the centralized rule of the ensuing imperial dynasties. I hope use this thesis in 
the future as a springboard for diving into this debate and hopefully bringing some new 
insights to the surface.
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